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"STICKY METAPHORS" AND THE PERSISTENCE OF THE




"[A]s a result of discovering the world through language,
for a long time I took language for the world."
-Jean-Paul Sartre (1964)
INTRODUCTION
This Article begins with a curious puzzle: Why has the traditional
voluntary manslaughter doctrine in criminal law-the so-called
"heat of passion" defense to a charge of murder-proven so resis-
tant to change, even in the face of more than a half-century of
seemingly compelling empirical and normative arguments in favor
of doctrinal reform? What could possibly account for the tradi-
tional doctrine's surprising resilience?
In this Article, we propose a solution to this puzzle. The Article
introduces a new conceptual theory about metaphor-the "sticky
metaphor" theory-that highlights an important aspect of meta-
phorical language and metaphorical thought that has been almost
completely overlooked in the existing literature of law, psychology,
and linguistics. We believe the "sticky metaphor" theory may turn
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1. Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsY-
CHOL. 1, 3 (1968) (quoting JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, WORDS 182 (1964)).
2. We do not claim that the "sticky metaphor" theory is the sole solution to the puzzle
described in the text, nor do we contend that it completely explains the resilience of the
traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine. Surely there are other reasons as well, includ-
ing the law's general resistance to change, see infra text accompanying note 68, and
normative arguments against expanding any defense to the crime of homicide, especially a
defense as problematic as the "heat of passion" defense, see infra text accompanying notes
41-51. Rather, we would describe the "sticky metaphor" theory as a kind of inertial force
that previously has not been, but must be, taken into account by anyone seeking to reform
the traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine.
The closest analogue to our concept of the "sticky metaphor" appears in the work of
Zoltin K6vecses, a Professor of Linguistics in the Department of American Studies at E6tv6s
Lorind University in Budapest, Hungary. Professor K6vecses has recently written about the
related concept of the "embodiment" of anger. We discuss K6vecses at greater length in Part
383
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out to be highly significant to both the voluntary manslaughter
doctrine in particular and the law in general.
Law is "a profession of words." Lawyers use language to define,
to explain, to bind and limit, to justify, and-perhaps most
centrally-to persuade. This is why it has been said that "[1]aw's
foundations are rooted in rhetoric."
One of the most powerful tools of persuasive language, or rheto-
ric, is the metaphor. Metaphorical structures such as the "wall of
separation"5 between church and state, the "marketplace of ideas"6
in free speech cases, and the "fruit of the poisonous tree"' doctrine
in criminal procedure law shape not only the way that lawyers and
judges talk and write about the law, but also the way they think
about the underlying legal concepts.
The potential influence of language on the development of the
law makes it a powerful force that can be marshaled to serve the
law's normative ends. But the power of language can also cause
unintended consequences and effects. A powerful metaphor, for
example, can lead to inferences and conclusions that would not be
reached by the bounded and structured logic of standard legal
analysis. "It is altogether likely that metaphoric 'reasoning' cuts
across, indeed rolls right over, the subtleties of ratio decidendi.",
Metaphor, with its inherent indirection, may be unusually prone to
II, infra. See also Zoltin K6vecses, Metaphor and Emotion, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 380, 392 (Raymond W. Gibbs ed., 2008).
3. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW, atvi (1963).
4. Delia B. Conti, Narrative Theory and the Law: A Rhetorician's Invitation to the Legal
Academy, 39 DUQ. L. REv. 457, 457 (2001).
5. This metaphor apparently originated with colonial leader Roger Williams in the
17th century. See Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered,
quoted in PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: His CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADI-
TION 98 (1953) ("[Wlhen they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation
between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke
down the wall itself, removed the candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness . . . ."); see
also Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1053, 1064 (1989).
6. This metaphor originated in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market. . . ."). See Steven L. Winter, Fast Food and False Friends in the Shop-
ping Mall ofIdeas, 64 U. COLo. L. REv. 965, 971-72 (1993).
7. This metaphor originated in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)
("[T]he trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove
that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree."). See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 509 (4th ed.
2003); Ross, supra note 5, at 1054-55.
8. Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1007 n.45 (1978).
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producing such unanticipated results. "In extreme circumstances,
a good metaphor may be so compelling that it altogether subverts
its referent's original meaning."9 Legal commentators have long
cautioned against this "dark side" of metaphor. Lord Mansfield
famously opined that "nothing in law is so apt to mislead as a met-
aphor."o And Justice Cardozo wrote, "Metaphors in law are to be
narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they
end often by enslaving it.""
Nevertheless, for good or for ill, metaphor is essential to human
discourse in general," and thus to legal discourse in particular. As
one author aptly (and metaphorically) pui it: "Legal discourse is
pregnant with metaphor."3 As such, metaphor has become the sub-
ject of considerable and well-deserved scholarly attention,
particularly in recent years. Scholars with backgrounds in cognitive
science, rhetoric, and philosophy have broadened our awareness of
the wide variety of types of legal metaphors and their important
role in influencing thought. 4 Others have focused on the strate-
gic use of metaphors in litigation and other contexts where legal
issues are debated or decided.'5 Most agree that metaphors must
9. Bernard J. Hibbits, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfigura-
tion of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOzO L. REV. 229, 234 (1994).
10. Knox v. Gye, (1872) 5 L.R.E. & I. App. 656 (H.L.) 676 (Eng.) (quoting Lord
Mansfield).
11. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
12. See Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REv. 845 (2007). See gen-
erally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO
POETIC METAPHOR, at xi (1989) ("Far from being merely a matter of words, metaphor is a
matter of thought-all kinds of thought: thought about emotion, about society, about hu-
man character, about language, and about the nature of life and death. It is indispensable
not only to our imagination but also to our reason."); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN
THOUGHT (1999); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATE-
GORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); David E. Leary, Psyche's Muse: The Role of Metaphor
in the History of Psychology, in METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OP PSYCHOLOGY 1 (David E. Leary
ed., 1990).
13. Adam Arms, Note, Metaphor, Women and Law, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 257, 257
(1999).
14. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAw, LIFE, AND MIND
(2001); Johnson, supra note 12; Ross, supra note 5; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Just Say "No
Fishing": The Lure of Metaphor, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2006); Steven L. Winter, Re-
Embodying Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 869 (2007); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes forLaw, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
15. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATE-
GIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING (2002); Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate
Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER
L. REV. 949 (2007); Linda L. Berger, What is the Sound of the Corporation Speaking? How the
Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING Di-
RECTORS 169 (2004); Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58
MERCER L. REV. 919 (2007).
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be chosen wisely and carefully, and that substituting a different
metaphorical structure can often serve as an effective method to
shift the terms of a particular legal debate.16
Not all metaphors, however, are created equal. Some metaphors
are not so easily modified or manipulated to serve rhetorical pur-
poses. Within the broad universe of metaphors, some seem more
natural than others-almost as if they are not being "chosen" at all.
For example, when we get angry, we "see red," our "blood boils,"
and we "explode." Such metaphors are deeply embedded in our
thinking about anger. They pop into our heads almost spontane-
ously." These are the kinds of metaphors we will call "sticky."
What makes such a metaphor "sticky"? We believe that the met-
aphorical structure of anger-together with the lay theory, or "folk
16. E.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter. How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex
Shape the Adversary System, 10 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 225, 226 (1995); cf Michael Goldberg,
Against Acting 'Humanely', 58 MERCER L. REv. 899, 904-05, 918 (2007).
[Bloth prosecutors and death-penalty defense attorneys ... view the call to act 'hu-
manely' not in the context of some storied account of 'humanity at its best' acting
'humanely' as it puts someone to death, but exclusively within the narrow framework
of an argument opposing capital punishment altogether. Within that limited frame of ref-
erence, the call to act 'humanely' becomes nothing more than a rhetorical
throwaway.
But, for prosecution and defense alike, their rather constricted view of the issue, no
matter how shared, may well restrict them from seeing the possibility of other argu-
ments arising from other contexts-arguments that, both pro and con, may prove
ultimately more persuasive. Prosecutors as well as defense lawyers need to see that
their context, like any human context, is not universal....
[L]ively rhetoric that animates truly spirited arguing can do more than simply strip
away any cover talk meant to deceive others about what, in truth, we or they might
desire or do. More potently, it can force our opponents and ourselves to dis-cover oth-
er possibilities to which we may have both been blinded by sharing the same myopic
context, a context that might give way to new, more panoramic ones as novel stories
are conceived and fresh metaphors devised.
Id.
17. We speak of spontaneity here, rather than pure automaticity, in order to leave
open the question of the precise degree to which the employment of such metaphors occurs
outside of control or awareness. Various psychological events have been shown to occur
without intention, while still ultimately entering into consciousness and even being subject
to some deliberate control. See Frederica R. Conrey, Jeffrey W. Sherman, Bertram Gawron-
ski, Kurt Hugenberg & CarlaJ. Groom, Separating Multiple Processes in Implicit Social Cognition:
The Quad Model of Implicit Task Perfomance, 89 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 469, 470
(2005); SoYon Rim, James S. Uleman & Yaacov Trope, Spontaneous Trait Inference and Con-
strual Level Theory: Psychological Distance Increases Nonconscious Trait Thinking, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1088, 1089 (2009); Jeffrey W. Sherman, On Building a Better
Process Model: It's Not Only How Many, but Which Ones and by Which Means?, 17 PsYCHOL. IN-
QUIRY 173, 179 (2006).
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psychology," of the emotion of anger that derives from it'-are
both based on our normal human physiological experience of an-
ger. This physiological experience includes a faster heartbeat, an
increase in blood pressure, and a flushing of the skin of the face
(i.e., one's face turns red).' 9 These are the same physiological re-
sponses that normally occur when one gets hot. In a physiological
sense, we experience anger and heat in the same way. When we
think and talk about anger, therefore, we naturally tend to use the
metaphorical structure of heat and the buildup of pressure in a
closed container 20 a metaphorical structure that also includes exci-
tation, the color red, and the potential for a violent explosion.
Metaphors for anger like "hot-blooded," "his rage boiled over," and
"I'm going to explode!" seem natural to us, given the human phys-
iology of anger.
We could perhaps choose different metaphors to describe anger,
but in light of our physiological experience of anger, it would not
make sense (or at least not nearly as much sense) for us to describe
anger as "wet," "heavy," or "lavender." Even more obviously, as a
general rule we do not describe anger in terms of the opposite of
heat, which would be cold. We say, "John burned with anger." We
might even say-by way ofjuxtaposition-"John was furious, but he
remained cool."21 What we do not say is that "John was icy cold with
anger." The human physiology of anger constrains our choice of
metaphors.2 2
18. See infra Figure 1, depicting our schematic model of how metaphor develops and
then shapes lay theory, or the "folk psychology," of emotion and its effects. Throughout this
Article, we will use the terms "lay theory" and "folk psychology" interchangeably.
19. See Peter D. Drummond & Saw Han Quah, The Effect of Expressing Anger on Cardio-
vascular Reactivity and Facial Blood Flow in Chinese and Caucasians, 38 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 190,
195 (2001); Paul Ekman, Robert W. Levenson & Wallace V. Friesen, Autonomic Nervous System
Activity Distinguishes Among Emotions, 221 SCIENCE 1208, 1210 (1983); Raymond W. Novaco,
Anger, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY (2000).
20. See LAKOFF &JOHNSON, supra note 12; LAKOFF, supra note 12.
21. Notice that, in this particular metaphorical expression (and ones like it), the anger
itself is not really "cool." Rather, the person is "cool," despite the presence of something
"hot" that "bums" inside them (i.e., their anger). The contrast is the key to understanding
the metaphor.
Even a common expression like "cold rage" is actually an exercise in juxtaposition-what
we really mean to say is that the person has somehow managed to remain "cold," despite
their highly aroused emotional state. The anger itself, however, cannot actually be "cold."
One might think about "cold rage" in terms of nuclear fuel rods being used to generate
electrical power-there's still a very "hot" nuclear reaction going on somewhere deep inside
those fuel rods, even though we have somehow managed to figure out how to keep the rods,
as well as the vessel that contains them, relatively "cool."
22. As we explain infra Part ILC, we do not contend that sticky metaphors are com-
pletely constrained or eliminate all freedom of metaphorical choice. Rather, our claim is
that, on a continuum, sticky metaphors are much more constrained than the typical meta-
phor.
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The extent to which the nature and characteristics of the physi-
cal world constrain our choice of metaphors is the extent to which
a particular metaphorical structure is "sticky." In many (perhaps
most) situations, there may be a wide range of possible choices for
the metaphors we use to describe a person, a thing, an action, or
an abstract concept. We can describe love as "kind," "wine,"
"blind,"2 "blue,"26 a "battlefield,"27 or a "drug."2 But when we de-
scribe the physical attributes of a strong man, our metaphorical
choices are much more narrowly constrained; he may be an "ox," a
"bear," or a "man of steel,"" but he cannot be a "ferret" or a "man
of tissue paper." The metaphors for physical strength are sticky to a
much greater extent than are the metaphors for love. The meta-
phors for physical strength appear self-evident, and an inconsistent
or incompatible metaphorical structure would seem entirely inap-
propriate. Sticky metaphors are, in this respect, inherently
dominant.
Metaphors for emotions share this same characteristic of sticki-
ness. This is because emotions produce physiological responses-
responses of the human body-that are evolutionary in origin and
relatively consistent even across different cultures. The physiology
of anger is remarkably similar to the physiology of heat, so the
dominant metaphorical structure for anger is based on heat. The
physiology of fear, on the other hand, includes goosebumps on the
skin and a draining of blood from the face, which therefore pales.
These are the same bodily responses that occur when a person be-
comes cold. The dominant metaphorical structure for fear is thus
based on cold: "a chill ran down his spine"; "he was frozen with
fear."
The relative stickiness of emotion metaphors complicates our
conventional understanding of metaphor and its impact on the
law. Where a legal doctrine is based in part on emotion, such as the
voluntary manslaughter doctrine, metaphor can become much
more than a mere rhetorical device. Because sticky metaphors are
not chosen freely from an infinite or broad range of possibilities,
they cannot easily be replaced with different metaphorical struc-
tures that might serve to reframe the relevant legal issue. Given
23. THE SEEKERS, Love is Kind, Love is Wine, on SEEN IN GREEN (EMI Records 1967).
24. Id.
25. ALICIA KEYS, Love is Blind, on THE ELEMENT OF FREEDOM (J Records 2009).
26. PAUL MAURIAT, Love is Blue, on BLOOMING HITS (Philips Records 1967).
27. PAT BENETAR, Love is a Battlefield, on LIVE FROM EARTH (Chrysalis Records 1983).
28. Roxy Music, Love is the Drug, on SIREN (Island Records 1974).
29. 1 JOHN BYRNE & DICK GIORDANO, THE MAN OF STEEL (1986) (Volume 1 of a six-
volume series of Superman comic books published by D.C. Comics).
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their stickiness, such metaphors would seem to be exceptionally
dangerous ones, much more likely to "enslave" than to "liberate"
thought.30
In this Article, we will begin by reviewing the legal doctrine of
voluntary manslaughter, the so-called "heat of passion" defense. We
will then develop our new conceptual theory of the sticky meta-
phor. Our account of sticky metaphors will be based on the latest
psychology research about metaphor, language, and emotion. We
will present a schematic model to illustrate how sticky metaphors
for emotions develop, and how they can affect legal doctrine. We
will analyze the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter as a prime ex-
ample of the role of sticky metaphors in the law, demonstrating
how such metaphors can constrain the law's evolution in ways in-
consistent with prevailing empirical and normative views about
how the law should change. We will use the same example of vol-
untary manslaughter doctrine to explore and contrast the
metaphorical structures of the emotions of anger and fear. We will
conclude with some observations about how the law, and lawyers,
might try to deal with the problem of the sticky metaphor, and we
will suggest some directions for future research into this fascinat-
ing realm at the boundary of law, linguistics, and psychology.
I. THE VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER DOCTRINE
In the Anglo-American criminal law of homicide, common-law
judges centuries ago developed the notion that some intentional
killings-those committed in the "heat of passion" resulting from
legally adequate provocation, and before the defendant had
enough time to "cool off'-are less deserving of blame and pun-
ishment than other intentional murders.3' This so-called "heat of
passion" defense32 does not completely exonerate the defendant;
instead, it partially mitigates the defendant's crime from inten-
tional murder down to voluntary manslaughter. In such cases, the
30. See supra text accompanying note 11.
31. SeeJoshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982). Leading cases on the voluntary manslaughter or "heat
of passion" defense include Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896); Flanagan v. State,
46 Ala. 703 (1871); People v. Logan, 164 P. 1121 (Cal. 1917); State v. Yanz, 50 A. 37 (Conn.
1901); Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862).
32. See, e.g., Collins v. United States, 150 U.S. 62, 64 (1893) ("The instruction chal-
lenged did not, when taken in connection with the other parts of the charge, present the
law inaccurately; for theretofore the judge had charged, substantially, that premeditation
was necessary to the crime of murder; and also, quoting from some authority, that 'voluntary
manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice, upon sudden quarrel, or in
the heat of passion.'").
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defendant's punishment also gets substantially reduced from what
would be imposed for intentional murder-generally by at least
half, depending on the law of the particular jurisdiction."
The traditional version of the doctrine of voluntary manslaugh-
ter operates as follows: assuming that the prosecutor can prove that
a defendant intentionally and wrongfully killed the victim, thus
satisfying the basic definition of the crime of murder, the defen-
dant may claim in response that the killing was provoked and
therefore not murder. In order to gain the benefit of the partial
mitigation of crime and sentence, the defendant must prevail on
both prongs of a two-pronged test: (1) Was the killing "adequately
provoked" by some event that caused the defendant to kill in the
"heat of passion"?3 5 (2) Did the killing occur before the defendant
had the chance to "cool off'? 6 Each of these two prongs, in turn,
includes two sub-parts, which the law describes as "objective" and
"subjective."0' The law asks "objectively" whether a hypothetical
"reasonable person" would have been provoked and would not
have cooled off.' The law also asks subjectively whether the actual
33. For example, in Virginia, the punishment for second-degree murder is five to forty
years. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (2009). By contrast, the punishment for voluntary man-
slaughter, a Class 5 felony crime, id. § 18.2-35, is only one to ten years, id. § 18.2-10(e).
In Indiana, the sentencing scheme for homicides is somewhat more complicated. The
punishment for murder, IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2010), is either a prison term of forty-five to
sixty-five years (and an advisory sentence of fifty-five years), id. § 35-50-2-3, or either life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole, id. § 35-50-2-8.5, or the death penalty, id. § 35-50-2-
9, if certain aggravating circumstances are present. Voluntary manslaughter, id. § 35-42-1-3,
can be either a Class B felony, with a prison term of six to twenty years (and an advisory
sentence of ten years), id. § 35-50-2-5, or a Class A felony, with a prison term of twenty to fifty
years (and an advisory sentence of thirty years), id. § 35-50-2-4, if it is committed with a dead-
ly weapon.
34. Voluntary manslaughter is not really a "defense" to a crime of murder. Rather, it is
simply a lesser homicide crime than the crime of murder. Voluntary manslaughter is some-
times referred to as a "defense" because it is generally advocated to the jury by the defense
lawyer, on behalf of the defendant, as an alternative to a murder conviction.
35. See JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY (1992); Dressler, supra
note 31; N.J. Finkel, Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, and Hamlet Brooding: On the Story of the
Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74 NEB. L. REV. 742 (1995).
36. See HORDER, supra note 35; Dressler, supra note 31; Finkel, supra note 35.
37. The law's use of the terms "objective" and "subjective" differs from the way those
same terms generally would be used in science. For example, psychologists would use the
term "objective" to refer to a condition in the real world that can be empirically studied,
such as the actual defendant's state of mind. "Subjective," on the other hand, would refer to
something that cannot be empirically studied-such as the state of mind of a hypothetical
"reasonable person."
38. See, e.g., Dandova v. State, 72 P.3d 325, 335 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (finding "heat
of passion" defense unavailable to defendant because a "reasonable person would have
cooled"); State v. Shane 590 N.E.2d 272, 279 (Ohio 1992) (holding that a reasonable person
would not have been provoked under the circumstances of the case).
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defendant was provoked and had not yet cooled off.39 The defen-
dant will prevail, and receive the benefit of the voluntary
manslaughter defense, only if all four of these issues-including
both sub-parts of both prongs of the test-are resolved in the de-
fendant's favor.
The traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine has been the
subject of a great deal of academic commentary, most of it criti-
cal.4 ' For one thing, the traditional version of the doctrine is
heavily gendered.42 The two paradigmatic common-law examples of
"adequate provocation" are (1) mutual combat that results in
death and (2) killings provoked by the witnessing of one's spouse
committing an act of adultery. Both examples almost always in-
volve killings by men, who tend much more frequently than
women to engage in mutual combat leading to death and also to
respond with homicidal violence after witnessing a spouse's adul-
tery." One might even conclude that the whole point of the
traditional doctrine was to partially exonerate men for behaving
like "typical" men. Even contemporary applications of the volun-
tary manslaughter doctrine sometimes reflect the same gendered
h45approach .
39. See, e.g., State v. Schreiner, 944 A.2d 250, 260 (Vt. 2007) ("In order to establish
manslaughter, four elements must be shown: (1) adequate provocation; (2) inadequate time
to 'cool off'; (3) actual provocation; and (4) actual failure to cool off." (citation omitted)).
40. See, e.g., Ex parte Fraley, 109 P. 295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910); State v. Gounagias,
153 P. 9 (Wash. 1915); Dressier, supra note 31, at 465.
41. For examples of such academic commentary, see Dressler, supra note 31; Reid
Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justification, 43
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27 (2009); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); Stephen J. Morse, The Irreducibly
Normative Nature of Provocation/Passion, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 193 (2009); Victoria
Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331
(1997); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Misunderstanding Provocation, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 143
(2009); Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37 RUTGERS
L.J. 197 (2005); Emily L. Miller, Comment, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender,
and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665 (2001).
42. See Rozelle, supra note 41; Miller, supra note 41.
43. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 204 N.E.2d 594 (1ll. App. Ct. 1965) (mutual combat);
Rowland v. State, 35 So. 826 (Miss. 1904) (witnessing adultery). See generally Dressler, supra
note 31.
The law's label, "heat of passion," is revealing in that it links the "heat" of anger with the
"passion" of sexual lust. Although "passion" is simply a synonym for lust in this context, ra-
ther than a metaphor, George Lakoff has pointed out that the metaphorical structure of lust
is nearly identical with that of anger-i.e., heat and pressure in a closed container. See LA-
KOFF, supra note 12, at 409-15.
44. See DAVID M. Buss, THE MURDERER NEXT DOOR: WHY THE MIND IS DESIGNED TO
KILL (2005).
45. See, for example, the news report of the 2005 British case of Christopher Willsher:
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Another problem with the traditional voluntary manslaughter
doctrine is that it lacks theoretical coherence in terms of the goals
of criminal law. The doctrine seems to be based on the idea that
the person who kills while in the "heat of passion" in response to
"adequate provocation" has behaved in a manner that is at least
understandable, even if not entirely excusable. But the criminal
law is also supposed to send a moral message to the entire society.
Indeed, the criminal law helps society to define the core moral
concepts of right and wrong in a way that also helps the society to
define itself.46 If the criminal law is intended to serve these demon-
strative and self-constitutive goals, then the traditional voluntary
manslaughter doctrine seems wrong-headed. At a minimum, the
traditional doctrine sends out a decidedly mixed and muddled
moral message.
Finally, the underlying rationale for the traditional doctrine ap-
pears hopelessly unclear. Some aspects of the doctrine make it
seem like a partial excuse defense: the defendant is partially ex-
cused because the killing was largely the result of a provoking
event that undermined the defendant's ability to exercise sound
judgment, and thus is not a true manifestation of the defendant's
character.48 Other aspects of the traditional doctrine, however,
make it seem like a partial justification defense: the provocation
must be wrongful,' and the victim must be the same person who
wrongfully provoked,"' making the doctrine seem more like a form
An impotent husband who encouraged his wife to sleep with other men stabbed her
to death when she told him that she was leaving for a lover 30 years her junior.
Christopher Willsher, 53, lost control and attacked his wife, Jeanette, with a kitchen
knife, stabbing her 112 times. Willsher was sentenced yesterday to six years impris-
onment after a judge at Plymouth Crown Court accepted his plea of guilty to
manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility.
Simon de Bruxelles, Wife Stabbed 112 Times Over Affair, TIMES (London),July 6, 2005, at 11.
46. See EMH.E DURKHEIM, THE DIvisioN OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 62-63 (W. D. Halls
trans., Free Press 1984) (1893); M. Clarke, Durkheim's Sociology of Law, 3 BRIT.J. LAW & Soc'Y
239 (1976); H.L.A. Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1968); Dale T. Miller & Neil Vidmar, The Social Psychology of Punishment Reactions, in THE
JUsTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 172 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981).
47. See Vera Bergelson, justification or Excuse? Exploring the Meaning of Provocation, 42
TEX. TECH L. REV. 307 (2009); Linda A. Malone, Is There Really a Difference Between Justifica-
tion and Excuse, or Did WeAcademics Makelt Upt?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 321 (2009).
48. Fontaine, supra note 41, at 45.
49. Marcia Baron, The Provocation Defense and the Nature ofJustification, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 117, 118 n.4 (2009).
50. See, e.g., Foster v. State, 444 S.E.2d 296, 296 n.2 (Ga. 1994) ("We seriously question
whether a charge on voluntary manslaughter is even authorized under the circumstances
presented here [where defendant was provoked, but accidentally shot and killed an inno-
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of "blaming the victim." Both of the paradigmatic examples of the
traditional doctrine-mutual combat and witnessing adultery-
clearly fit this latter description. The adultery cases are especially
troubling, reflecting the same gender bias that can also be seen in
the law's historic devaluation of married women as the "property"
of their husbands.51
In a 2007 article published in the Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, Sherman and Hoffmann discussed the psychology and law
of the voluntary manslaughter doctrine. Sherman and Hoffmann
explained that the traditional formulation of the doctrine reflected
a simplistic (and inaccurate) set of assumptions about the emotion
of anger.5 ' The doctrine seems premised on the view that anger is
an emotional response that is caused by, and immediately follows,
the occurrence of a sufficiently provoking event. Pursuant to this
view, anger, once provoked, almost immediately begins to dissipate
with the passage of time. Criminal law incorporates the "time
course of anger" as reflected in this view, which explains why the
traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine applies only to cases of
anger occurring in immediate response to the provoking event,
and also why there is a separate "cooling off" prong to the tradi-
tional doctrine.
Sherman and Hoffmann observed that some of the law's as-
sumptions about anger fail to correspond completely with
psychological reality.5 Modem psychology research demonstrates
that the emotions, including anger, do not always operate as the
law seems to believe. The studies paint a much more complex pic-
ture of the emotion of anger. Provoking events do not always
cent third party]. Traditionally, the provocation which would authorize such a charge must
arise from some action of the deceased, or at least that the defendant reasonably so believed."
(citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. at 57 (1980))).
51. See LORENNE M.G. CLARK & DEBRA J. LEWIs, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXU-
ALITY 112-17 (1977) (noting that women have been treated as "objects rather than the
subjects of property rights: women were among the forms of private property owned and
controlled by individual men"). Such views were reflected in the criminal law's traditional
rule that a man could not be convicted of raping his wife. Moreover, the traditional volun-
tary manslaughter doctrine-and especially the treatment of adultery cases-might be
characterized as more protective of the husband's "property right" in his wife than as a pro-
tection of the personal integrity of the wife.
52. Steven J. Sherman & Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Psychology and Law of Voluntary Man-
slaughter: What Can Psychology Research Teach Us About the "Heat of Passion" Defense?, 20 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 499 (2007).
53. Id. at 501-02.
54. Id. at 502 fig.1.
55. Id. at 502-06.
56. For examples of psychology pieces discussing the complexity of anger, see PAULA
NIEDENTHAL, SILVIA KRAuTH-GRUBER & FRANCOIs Ric, PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION: INTER-
PERSONAL, EXPERIENTIAL, AND COGNITIVE APPROACHES 15 (2006); P. Ekman, Levenson &
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immediately generate angry responses; sometimes, anger builds
more slowly, over time, as a person broods about the provoking
event." In other situations, anger results from a series of provoca-
tions, none of which, standing alone, would suffice to provoke such
anger. These studies might support the extension of the voluntary
manslaughter defense to cases involving brooding anger, successive
provocations leading to a violent reaction, and the like.
Modem psychology research also demonstrates that anger is not
the only emotion that can have strongly negative effects on deci-
sion-making and instigate violent, even lethal, responses. Intense
fear, for example, may cause similar effects." If fear can impair
human judgment in ways that are comparable to the effects of an-
ger, then those who intentionally kill as a result of fear (but not in
what the law considers to be self-defense) may deserve partial miti-
gation of crime and sentence as well.
Modem proposals for reforming the law of voluntary man-
slaughter have sought to bring these insights from psychology
research into the criminal law. The most significant such reform
effort was spearheaded by the American Law Institute (ALI), a re-
spected legal think tank that promulgated the Model Penal Code
(MPG) in the 1960s.59 The ALI, as one part of this comprehensive
proposal to rationalize and modernize all of American criminal
law, argued that the new crime of manslaughter (which encom-
passed the old crime of voluntary manslaughter) should be
redefined as follows:
Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when ... a hom-
icide which would otherwise be murder is committed under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reason-
ableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined
Friesen, supra note 19, at 1209; Nico H. Frijda, Peter Kuipers & Elisabeth ter Schure, Rela-
tions Among Emotion, Appraisal, and Emotional Action Readiness, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 212, 226 (1989); Nico H. Frijda, The Laws ofEmotion, 43 AM. PSYCHOL. 349, 350-51
(1988); Eddie Harmon-Jones &John J.B. Allen, Anger and Frontal Brain Activity: EEG Asymme-
try Consistent with Approach Motivation Despite Negative Affective Valence, 74 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 1310, 1311 (1998); Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Beyond Valence: To-
ward a Model of Emotion-specific Influences onjudgement and Choice, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION
473, 480 (2000).
57. See Cheryl L. Rusting and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Regulating Responses to Anger: Ef-
fects of Rumination and Distraction on Angry Mood, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 790,
800 (1998).
58. Sherman & Hoffmann, supra note 52, at 510-13.
59. See MODEL PENAL CODE (1963).
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from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under
the circumstances as he believes them to be.6
This proposed new MPC redefinition of the "heat of passion"
defense was designed primarily to do two things: (1) emphasize the
doctrine's proper characterization as a partial excuse defense, with
the primary focus on the defendant's state of mind, rather than a
partial justification defense that depends on the wrongfulness of
the victim's conduct; and (2) broaden the scope of the doctrine
beyond the traditional paradigms of mutual combat and witnessing
adultery, as well as beyond the traditional emotion of anger.6 1
The MPC's new version of the manslaughter crime has received
substantial scholarly attention, most of it positive, but has been
adopted by relatively few state criminal statutes.2 The MPC version
may have had an impact in terms of encouraging courts in
non-MPC jurisdictions to construe the scope of the voluntary man-
slaughter defense somewhat more broadly than before. But it is
safe to say that the ALI's bold attempt to reform the voluntary
manslaughter doctrine has met with less than rousing success.
Judges in the real world continue to be influenced by justification
principles as well as excuse principles," and ultimately seem reluc-
tant to extend the scope of the doctrine very far beyond the
traditional paradigms and the traditional emotion of anger.
Sherman and Hoffmann hypothesized that this resistance to
change might, in part, be a byproduct of metaphorical language
and metaphorical thought. 5 The colloquial label most frequently
attached to the voluntary manslaughter doctrine-the "heat of pas-
sion" defense-clearly reflects its underlying metaphorical
structure. The prevailing metaphor is that anger (as generated by
the provoking event) equals heat/force/pressure in a closed con-
tainer. The provoking event acts as the heat source, which causes
the provoked person to become "hot" with anger, which in turn
leads to buildup of pressure, which ultimately finds its release
through an act of lethal violence. While the metaphorical structure
neither completely justifies nor completely excuses the provoked
killing, it provides a kind of explanation for the killer's lethal
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (b) (1985).
61. See id. § 210.3 cmt.; MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 265-
71 (2002).
62. Fontaine, supra note 41, at 28 ("[N]umerous states have not adopted the MPC's
language . . . .").
63. Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Refledions on a Difficult Sub-
ject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002).
64. Baron, supra note 49.
65. Sherman & Hoffmann, supra note 52, at 506-09.
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violence that supports the law's traditional mitigation of crime and
punishment.
Sherman and Hoffmann, citing the work of linguist George La-
koff," speculated that the metaphorical structure that underlies
the traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine might also play
some role in the law's adherence to that doctrine. According to the
authors, "[T]he limitations of our metaphorical language-the
language that, according to Lakoff, both defines and constrains
our cognitive sense of the concept of anger-may be at least partly
responsible for the law's adherence to tradition in this area."67 The
authors also noted as possible contributing factors the law's gen-
eral inertia, as well as the specific and well-documented reluctance
of many legal decision-makers, no matter what the subject area, to
base changes in the law on the latest scientific research.
In the next section, we will begin to outline the solution to the
puzzle with which we started this Article. The new conceptual the-
ory of the sticky metaphor, a theory based on the latest research
but heretofore unrecognized in the literature on metaphor, will
provide an explanation for the traditional voluntary manslaughter
doctrine's persistent resistance to change. The new theory will also
open up new and exciting areas of inquiry and empirical research,
promising to change our conventional wisdom about metaphor
and the law.
II. KILLING IN THE "HEAT OF PASSION": ANGER AND THE
CONCEPTUAL THEORY OF THE "STICKY METAPHOR"
Metaphor, it seems safe to say, has always played an important
role in the law. But only relatively recently has metaphor become
the focus of significant scholarly attention and scientific study.
The conventional wisdom about metaphor and the law includes
the following observations: (1) metaphors are everywhere, in the
law and in life (indeed, some argue that no human thought is pos-
sible without them); (2) metaphors serve important rhetorical
purposes and can be used by lawyers in pursuit of normative goals;
(3) metaphors are powerful tools that must be chosen and wielded
carefully in order to ensure that the proper normative ends are
served and to avoid unintended consequences.'
66. LAKOFF &JOHNSON, supra note 12; LAxoFF, supra note 12.
67. Sherman & Hoffmann, supra note 52, at 510.
68. Id.
69. For a recent excellent symposium on the topic of metaphor and the law, see Sym-
posium, Using Metaphor in Legal Analysis and Communication, 58 MERCER L. REv. 835 (2007).
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This conventional wisdom implicitly assumes that metaphors,
like other rhetorical devices, are subject to relatively free choice.o
If a particular metaphor, or metaphorical structure, fails to bring
about the desired rhetorical or normative result, then the lawyer
should choose a different metaphor that can better serve the
desired goal. As a defense lawyer trying to persuade a jury to find
reasonable doubt about a defendant's state of mind (and therefore
guilt), one might choose to talk about the mind as an opaque con-
tainer: "you can't go into the defendant's mind and decide what
exactly was going through it at the time he fired that shot";
"science hasn't invented the instrument which can look inside
someone's head."7 The prosecutor in the same case might prefer
to talk about the mind as a machine open to observation: "he cal-
culated his next move"; "his mind went into high gear"; "at that
point, the wheels started spinning."72
We propose to challenge the conventional wisdom about the
malleability of metaphor by taking a closer look at what psycholo-
gists and linguists have learned in recent years about metaphor,
language, and emotion. Our examination of the latest scientific
research will reveal the heretofore largely unnoticed existence of a
special subset of metaphors that we call "sticky metaphors." Sticky
metaphors are special because they are metaphors derived from
physical experience. Because sticky metaphors are grounded in the
physical world, they seem natural and unchosen. The relevant
physical experience constrains our choice of metaphors; no matter
how much one might wish to do so for rhetorical purposes, it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to choose different metaphors that
are incompatible with the physical experience. This is why sticky
metaphors are inherently dominant.
In the sections that follow, we will introduce our conceptual
theory of sticky metaphors. We will start by briefly reviewing the
current state of psychological knowledge about emotion and anger.
We will then present our schematic model of sticky metaphors for
emotions, a model that describes how such metaphors originate
and how they can influence the evolution of legal doctrine. We will
use the specific example of the metaphorical structure for the
70. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 15, at 930.
71. See Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to aJu-
iy, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 55, 118-21 (1992).
72. See id. The previously quoted "mind as a container" metaphorical expressions were
actually used during the criminal trial that Amsterdam and Hertz studied-although they
were used by the prosecutor, a fact that the authors found puzzling. The authors suggested
that the prosecutor probably should have chosen the alternative metaphor of "mind as a
machine."
397WINTER 2011]1
University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
emotion of anger-a clear example of a sticky metaphor-to illus-
trate the development of sticky metaphors and their impact on the
law. We will argue that the criminal law's adherence to the tradi-
tional voluntary manslaughter doctrine in part reflects the relative
stickiness of the metaphorical structure for anger, which impedes
the implementation of a more sophisticated and nuanced version
of the doctrine. Our conceptual theory and schematic model helps
to explain why the traditional doctrine is applied so unevenly and
why it is so resistant to change.
Our schematic model of sticky metaphors for emotions, as
shown in Figure 1, consists of five stages. The first stage is an
event or series of events that triggers an emotion, which is experi-
enced in part as a set of normal physiological responses. The
second stage is the conscious or unconscious awareness that these
normal physiological responses are similar to those typically ex-
perienced in a different setting or context. The third stage is the
conceptualization of the particular emotion in metaphorical terms,
based on the similarity in the physiological responses. The fourth
stage is the development of a lay theory of the particular emotion
derived from this metaphorical structure. The fifth and final stage
is the effect of the lay theory of the particular emotion, and the
sticky metaphor from which it derives, on the evolution of legal
doctrine based on the same emotion.
73. These five stages are meant to be conceptual and relational, not necessarily strictly
sequential in the chronological sense. K6vecses makes a similar point in his discussion of the
relationship between emotion metaphors and cultural models of emotion:
We should of course not imagine the process of the emergence of cultural models in
sequential steps, going from experiential basis to cultural model. A probably more
accurate way of thinking about it would be to say that the components ... are all at
work at the same time, mutually influencing each other. In the course of this joint
evolution, the conceptualized experiential basis ... and the emerging conceptual
metaphors contribute to the basic schematic structure of the cultural model, while
the simultaneously present cultural context fleshes out the details of the schema.
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The voluntary manslaughter doctrine is based on emotion and
emotional experience, especially those emotions that can lead to
murderous impulses. Anger and fear are thus central to the volun-
tary manslaughter doctrine, as defendants frequently seek to
invoke the doctrine when one or both of these emotions arise
strongly in the aftermath of a provoking event. Because in practice
the traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine applies primarily
to cases of anger,14 we will begin by describing our theory and
model in terms of the emotion of anger. Later, we will do the same
for the emotion of fear, and we will discuss some important differ-
ences between anger and fear that may explain why killings
resulting from those two emotions are often treated differently
with regard to the voluntary manslaughter doctrine.
A. What Psychology Has Learned About the Emotion of Anger
What do we know about the nature of emotions like anger? In
modem psychology research, emotional experience is viewed as a
syndrome involving several components." The experience of emo-
tion results from the interaction of physiological reactions,
thoughts, behaviors, and an awareness of the physiological reac-
tions.
74. Manslaughter, in 6 WEST's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAw 421, 422 (Jeffrey
Lehman & Shirelle Phelps eds., 2d ed. 2005) ("The most common type of voluntary man-
slaughter occurs when a defendant is provoked to commit the homicide. It is sometimes
described as a heat of passion killing. In most cases, the provocation must induce rage or
anger in the defendant, although some cases have held that fright, terror, or desperation
will suffice.").
75. See id.; see alsoJOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 535-38 (5th ed.
2009).
76. EMOTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS 1-2 (Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal &
Piotr Winkielman eds., 2005).
77. See NIEDENTHAL, KRAUTH-GRUBER & Ric, supra note 56, at 14-15.
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There is a long-standing debate in psychology about whether the
result of this interaction of several components is a general form of
arousal common to all emotions or an emotion-specific form of
arousal. Schachter and Singer"' and Zillmann" take the position
that the arousal resulting from all emotions is the same. They ar-
gue that what differentiates the different emotions is merely the
person's cognitive appraisal of this arousal. Thus, the very same
arousal state might be interpreted and experienced as anger, fear,
or disgust, depending on the surrounding cues and context."o
More recent studies, however, have produced compelling evi-
dence of emotional specificity, with different brain activations
occurring for different emotions. For example, Harmon-Jones and
his colleagues have demonstrated that the brain activation associ-
ated with the emotion of anger is quite different from the brain
activation associated with other negative emotions. More specifi-
cally, anger is associated with activation in the left anterior cortical
area of the brain. This research on the brain confirms that the
emotion of anger is characterized by its own emotion-specific form
of arousal.
The foundational empirical assumption underlying the tradi-
tional voluntary manslaughter doctrine is that strong anger can
lead to highly aggressive and even homicidal behavior. Psychology
research tends to confirm this assumption. Emotions are strongly
linked to behavior. Emotions engage the body for behavior and
prepare people for action. For anger, the predominant behav-
ior-unless restraint is successfully engaged-is attack. Such
behavior can be quite extreme and highly aggressive in nature.
Psychologists have often demonstrated the extremely aggressive
78. Stanley Schachter & Jerome E. Singer, Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determi-
nants ofEmotional State, 69 PSYCHOL. REV. 379, 380, 395 (1962).
79. Dolf Zillmann, Aaron H. Katcher & Barry Milavsky, Excitation Transfer from Physical
Exercise to Subsequent Aggressive Behavior, 8J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 247, 253 (1972).
80. See Schachter & Singer, supra note 78, at 395; Zillmann, Katcher & Milavsky, supra
note 79, at 253.
81. See Charles S. Carver & Eddie Harmon-Jones, Anger Is an Approach-Related Affect: Ev-
idence and Implications, 135 PSYCHoL. BULL. 183, 197 (2009); Jan Wacker, Marcus Heldmann
& Gerhard Stemmler, Separating Emotion and Motivational Direction in Fear and Anger Effects on
Frontal Asymmetry, 3 EMoTION 167, 185 (2003).
82. Carver & Harmon-Jones, supra note 81, at 187.
83. Eliot R. Smith & Giin R. Semin, Socially Situated Cognition: Cognition in Its Social Con-
text, 36 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (2004); Margaret Wilson, Six
Views ofEmbodied Cognition, 9 PSYCHONOMIc BULL. & REV. 625, 626 (2002).
84. 'ALTER B. CANNON, BODILY CHANGES IN PAIN, HUNGER, FEAR AND RAGE 155
(1915); C. Nathan DeWall et al., Violence Restrained: Effects of Self-Regulation and Its Depletion on
Aggression, 43J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 62, 74 (2007).
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consequences of anger."5 Thus, the law's assumption that anger can
lead to lethal violence seems to rest on solid empirical ground.
Another important set of empirical assumptions about emotion
underlying the traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine in-
volves the instigation of anger and the "cooling off" period. 6 The
traditional doctrine assumes that emotional arousal, especially for
the emotion of anger, quickly reaches a peak and then begins to
diminish with the mere passage of time, soon bringing the level of
emotion below the "adequate provocation" threshold required for
the application of the voluntary manslaughter doctrine.87 The doc-
trine's empirical assumptions about the "time course of anger" are
depicted in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
The Law's Time Course of Anger
- Defendants Anger
------------- ---------------- -- Legal Threshold for
Voluntary Manslaughter
Time After Provocation
What can psychology research and theory teach us about the
law's traditional view of the "time course of anger"? The assump-
tion that anger reaches its peak shortly after the provoking event
may hold true in some situations, but not in all. Bushman and his
colleagues found that rumination after an emotionally provoking
anger situation (for example, learning about an adulterous
spouse) increases both the likelihood and the strength of the
85. See, e.g., Brad. J. Bushman, Does Venting Anger Feed or Extinguish the Flame? Catharsis,
Rumination, Distraction, Anger, and Aggressive Responding, 28 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 724, 729 (2002).
86. See Sherman & Hoffmann, supra note 52, at 501-02.
87. See Santana v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) ("[A]lthough
'sudden heat can survive for a while beyond the act of provocation' . . . [defendant's] sud-
den heat could not have survived the span of approximately 30 minutes which separated the
initial provocation from the shooting. . . ." (citations omitted)).
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anger and of any accompanying aggressive responses." In other
words, anger may start out small but continue to increase long af-
ter the provoking event is over. Thoughts and subsequent events
that occur for some time after the initial provocation can maintain
or even exacerbate anger-as when people say, "The more I
thought about it, the angrier I became."
The traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine's assumption
about a relatively short "cooling off' period also may be empirically
questionable. One relevant research finding is that anger often
lingers for quite a long time after the initial provocation." The ac-
tion tendency for anger can be maintained until the moment when
an emotion-relieving action is finally taken.o The mere passage of
time, by itself, is not always sufficient to reduce the provoked emo-
tion.
In addition, research shows that attempts to suppress an emo-
tion like anger often backfire, further undermining the law's
assumption about "cooling off."9' During a particularly provoking
event (for example, catching one's spouse in an adulterous situa-
tion, the paradigmatic voluntary manslaughter scenario), some
individuals may try to remain calm and refrain from any outbursts
of anger or aggressive action. Such attempts at emotional suppres-
sion, however, typically are accompanied by greater, rather than
lesser, emotional arousal.92 One can manage to appear quite calm
on the outside and yet experience an increased level of emotion
internally.93 Moreover, the level of emotion commonly increases
and intensifies even more after the suppression attempts cease.
Thus, emotions such as anger can reach extremely high levels after
an individual attempts to control them. This "emotion flooding" is
88. Brad J. Bushman, Angelica M. Bonacci, William C. Pedersen, Eduardo A. Vasquez
& Normal Miller, Chewing on It Can Chew You Up: Effects of Rumination on Triggered Displaced
Aggression, 88J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 969, 980 (2005).
89. See Frijda, supra note 56, at 354; Lerner & Keltner, supra note 56; Jennifer S. Ler-
ner, Roxana M. Gonzales, Deborah A. Small & Baruch Fischhoff, Effects of Fear and Anger on
Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment, 14 PSYCHOL. ScI. 144, 155 (2003);
Jennifer S. Lerner & Larissa Z. Tiedens, Portrait of the Angry Decision Maker: How Appraisal
Tendencies Shape Anger's Influence on Cognition, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 115, 130
(2006); Larissa Z. Tiedens & Susan Linton, judgment Under Emotional Certainty and Uncer-
tainty: The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 973, 978 (2001).
90. See Lerner & Keltner, supra note 56, at 488-89.
91. See Sherman & Hoffmann, supra note 52, at 505-06.
92. James J. Gross & Robert W. Levenson, Emotional Suppression: Physiology, Self-Report,
and Expressive Behavior, 64 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 970, 979 (1993); Daniel M.
Wegner, Joanne W. Shortt, Anne W. Blake & Michelle S. Page, The Suppression of Exciting
Thoughts, 58J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 409, 415 (1990).
93. Jane M. Richards &JamesJ. Gross, Composure at Any Cost? The Cognitive Consequences
ofEmotion Suppression, 25 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 1033, 1033 (1999).
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similar in nature to the way that people tend to think more about
an object (for example, a pink elephant) following attempts to
suppress thinking about that object.94
In short, current psychology research and theory support the
foundational assumption of the traditional voluntary manslaughter
doctrine that strong anger can lead to homicidal behavior. But psy-
chology research and theory, as well as the clinical observations of
psychologists, do not generally support the law's empirical assump-
tions regarding a quick onset of anger and a short "cooling off'
period. How, then, can we account for the existence of the legal
doctrine? How did such a doctrine-one that we now know to be
incompatible with scientific evidence and with a good deal of eve-
ryday observation-arise in the first place? And why has it persisted
for so long, when new evidence is continually being discovered that
calls into serious question some of its empirical assumptions? We
turn next to these important questions. Later, we will address the
related question of how to account for the troubling fact that the
voluntary manslaughter doctrine is applied more frequently to
murders that are committed out of anger (usually by men) than to
those committed out of fear (often by women) .9
B. Stage One and Stage Two: The Physiological Experience of Anger
and Its Similarity to the Physiological Experience of Heat
The first stage in our schematic model of sticky metaphors for
emotions involves an event (or series of events) that generates an
emotional response. As discussed in the preceding section, emo-
tions are experienced as an emotion-specific set of physiological
responses. The emotion of anger is typically characterized by the
experience of one or more of the following physiological
responses:
* flushing of the face
* flaring of the nostrils
* clenching of the jaw
* general muscular tension
* increase in heart rate
* increase in blood pressure
* increase in blood flow to the hands
94. See Daniel M. Wegner, David J. Schneider, Samuel R. Carter & Teri L. White, Para-
doxicalEffects of Thought Suppression, 53J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 11-12 (1987).
95. SeeRozelle, supra note 41, at 199 n.6; Miller, supra note 41, at 681-82.
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* increase in skin temperature
* increase in perspiration9 6
These physiological responses appear to be consistent across dif-
ferent cultures.
Most of the physiological responses associated with anger are
exactly the same as the normal physiological responses to heat: the
flushing of the face, the flaring of the nostrils, the increase in heart
rate and blood pressure, the increase in skin temperature and per-
spiration. Interestingly, the physiological relationship between
anger and heat also runs in the opposite direction-physical envi-
ronments with higher temperatures have been associated with a
greater incidence of aggression." This is consistent with Zillmann's
excitation transfer model in which physiological responses pro-
duced by one cause (for example, ambient temperature) are
interpreted as being due to a very different cause (for example,
anger provocation).9
The second stage in our model involves the process by which the
physiological experiences normally associated with particular emo-
tions are analogized to other physiological experiences that share
certain similar outward characteristics, such as the comparison of
anger and heat.'00 In terms of the development of the traditional
voluntary manslaughter doctrine, some particularly relevant writ-
ing in psychology discusses the way that people analogize the
emotion of anger to the experiences of heat and of pressure in a
closed container.' Angry people might describe themselves as
"burning with rage," "on fire," or "on the verge of exploding." In
addition to the analogy of the "hot" person as a method for con-
ceptualizing anger, the heat analogy also depicts the hot object,
most commonly a pot or a kettle of water placed near a heat
102
source.
As we experience the physiological responses associated with the
emotion of anger, we become consciously or unconsciously aware
of the close similarity between those responses and the ones nor-
mally experienced in connection with heat.
96. Novaco, supra note 19.
97. See Drummond & Quah, supra note 19, at 194-195.
98. Craig A. Anderson, Heat and Violence, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sc. 33,
34 (2001); Craig A. Anderson, Brad J. Bushman & Ralph W. Groom, Hot Years and Serious
and Deadly Assault: Empirical Tests of the Heat Hypothesis, 73 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1213, 1221 (1997).
99. See generally Zillman, Katcher & Milavsky, supra note 79, at 250.
100. See K6vecses, supra note 2, at 156; Chen-Bo Zhong & GeoffreyJ. Leonardelli, Cold
and Lonely: Does Social Exclusion Literally Feel Cold?, 19 PSYCHOL. Sci. 838, 840 (2008).
101. See LAKOFF, supra note 12, at 384-89.
102. K6vecses, supra note 2, at 148.
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This kind of similarity allows us to develop an understanding of
the concept of emotion that would otherwise lie beyond our ability.
As Lakoff and Johnson note:
[M]any aspects of our experience cannot be clearly deline-
ated in terms of the naturally emergent dimensions of our
experience. This is typically the case for human emotions ....
Though most of these can be experienced directly, none of
them can be fully comprehended on their own terms. Instead,
we must understand them in terms of other entities and ex-
* 103periences ....
Growing evidence from research in psycholinguistics suggests that
much of human cognition is "grounded" in these kinds of simple,
concrete analogies of embodied experience.'0 4 Such research em-
phasizes not only that humans use concrete experience to
understand and communicate about concepts, but also that the
reliance on these "embodied" analogies leads to particular ways of
perceiving the world.
Research in psychological science provides some very interesting
demonstrations of these effects. For example, engaging in unethi-
cal (or "morally impure") behavior increases the tendency to
pursue certain bodily "purifying" tasks, such as hand washing. 10
Recent work on spatial metaphors has demonstrated that people
believe that it takes more effort to travel "up north" than "down
south" in a variety of contexts.' As evidenced by research on
"power" metaphors, people who are physically located higher up
(i.e., "above us") in vertical space are perceived as more powerful
than those located below (i.e., "beneath us").' With respect to
emotion, recent work has highlighted the strong link between
emotion metaphors and bodily experience: after an experience of
social exclusion (being "left out in the cold"), people perceive the
temperature to be lower and show an increased interest in eating
warm foods.08 In all of these cases, the behavior that results is a re-
sponse to the experience as it is colored by the metaphor (e.g.,
103. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARKJOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 177 (1980).
104. LAKOFF &JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 6; LAKoFF, supra note 12, at 281.
105. Chen-Bo Zhong & Katie Liljenquist, Washing Away Your Sins: Threatened Morality
and Physical Cleansing, 313 SCIENCE 1451, 1452 (2006).
106. Leif D. Nelson & Joseph P. Simmons, On Southbound Ease and Northbound Fees: Lit-
eral Consequences of the Metaphoric Link Between Vertical Position and Cardinal Direction, 46 J.
MARKETING RES. 715, 716, 722-23 (2009).
107. Thomas W. Schubert, Your Highness: Vertical Positions as Perceptual Symbols of Power,
89J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1, 16 (2005).
108. Zhong & Leonardelli, supra note 100, at 840.
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"feeling dirty," "trudging up to the gas station," "looking down on
those below me," "people behaving coldly") and not the raw ex-
perience itself (an unethical act committed, a particular distance
to be traveled, another person to be perceived at some irrelevant
vertical height, an unpleasant social situation to be endured) .'"
C. Stage Three: Sticky Metaphors for Anger
The third stage of our model involves the conceptualization of
the emotion of anger in metaphorical terms. The conscious or un-
conscious awareness of the similarity between the physiology of
anger and the physiology of heat leads us to think about, and talk
about, the emotion of anger by using the metaphorical structure of
heat. In much the same way, given the physiological experience of
facial flushing and increased heart rate and blood pressure associ-
ated with anger, the metaphorical structure for anger also includes
the metaphor of pressure in a closed container-which is also the
normal consequence of applying heat to a closed container con-
taining fluid (in this case, the human body and its circulatory
system). The metaphor of "anger = heat and pressure in a closed
container" provides us with a way to think about the concept of
anger, and it is also reflected in the language we use to describe
anger: "I was seething"; "a burning rage"; "I felt as if my head
would explode." Although the experience of anger is not identical
to the experience of being in a sweltering auditorium, or of stand-
ing over a hot stove, it is a similar enough experience-because of
its basic physiological characteristics-that it can be conceptualized
in the same way these metaphors imply.'10
These metaphors for anger are neither arbitrary nor accidental.
Anger is not conceptualized as heat and pressure by mere happen-
stance, nor by free choice, as if one could easily substitute other
metaphors. Heat and pressure metaphors are used for anger be-
cause they both share certain physiological characteristics.
Metaphors often inhere in physiological reactions to a particular
situation, and such reactions are a very common origin of meta-
phors."' There are many examples, such as "feeling butterflies in
109. See infra note 121 (explaining how George Lakoffs notion of an "embodied" met-
aphor differs substantially from the way we use that term in this Article).
110. Cf Ekman, Levenson & Friesen, supra note 19, at 1210; Robert W. Levenson et al.,
Emotion and Autonomic Nervous System Activity in the Minanghabau of West Sumatra, 62 J. PER-
SONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 972, 977, 986 (1992); Gerhard Stemmler, Physiological Processes
DuringEmotion, in THE REGULATION OF EMOTION 33, 46, 54-55 (Pierre Philippot & Robert S.
Feldman eds., 2004).
111. LAKOFF, supra note 12, at 388.
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one's stomach" and "my foot fell asleep." Metaphors that develop
to describe such physiological experiences are thus quite different
from metaphors that develop for abstract ideas. Running fast can
be metaphorically described in various ways ("he runs like the
wind"; "he's a gazelle"), but not in terms of anvils or snails. A red-
headed person can be called "carrot-top," but cannot be called
"broccoli-top."
All emotions involve bodily reactions, and such bodily reactions
affect thinking, judgment, and decisions. 112 Metaphors that are de-
rived from emotions are thus "embodied," and these are the kinds
of metaphors that are among the stickiest.
Because the human physiological responses to anger are univer-
sal, the metaphorical structure for anger-in its broadest sense-
does not depend on culture. As Zolt~in K6vecses wrote, " [T]he em-
bodiment of anger appears to constrain ... the kinds of metaphors
that can emerge as viable conceptualizations of anger. This seems
to be the reason why very similar metaphors have emerged for the
concept in a variety of different cultures.""3
At the same time, K6vecses notes that different cultures, or even
the same culture during different eras, may emphasize different
aspects of the same "embodied" metaphorical structure. For exam-
ple, as we have noted, the "embodied" metaphorical structure for
anger includes both heat and pressure inside a closed container. In
present-day Chinese, the primary metaphors for anger involve
pressure but not heat, whereas in English both heat and pressure
metaphors currently prevail. According to K6vecses:
This indicates that speakers of Chinese have relied on a dif-
ferent aspect of their physiology in the metaphorical
conceptualization of anger than speakers of English. The ma-
jor point is that in many cases the universality of experiential
basis does not necessarily lead to universally equivalent con-
ceptualization-at least not at the specific level of hot fluids,
in the case of anger."4
This leads to his conclusion that "we should not expect any of the
conceptualized responses associated with anger to remain constant
112. Cf Daniel Casasanto, Embodiment of Abstract Concepts: Good and Bad in Right- and Left-
Handers, 138 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: GEN. 351, 365 (2009) (noting that all emotions
involve bodily reactions and that such bodily reactions affect thinking, judgment, and deci-
sions); Daniel Casasanto & Katinka Dijkstra, Motor Action and Emotional Memory, 115
CoGNITION 179, 182-84 (2010).
113. K6vecses, supra note 2, at 160.
114. Id.at 393.
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in conceptualizing anger (and the emotions in general) through-
out the ages. Experiential focus may change across time even
within the same language.""5 In short, even with respect to sticky
metaphors, there may be enough "wiggle room" to emphasize one
aspect of the "embodied" metaphorical structure rather than an-
other. What one cannot so easily do, however, is adopt an entirely
different metaphorical structure that is wholly inconsistent with the
underlying physiological experience of the emotion in question.
Anger can be hot, or anger can be like pressure, but anger cannot
be wet or heavy.
The role of similarity in the development and use of such meta-
phors is much like the role of similarity in reasoning about causes
and effects. For example, jaundice (known to cause yellow skin and
eyes) was once thought to be caused by the consumption of yellow
foods. In a similar way, large effects (e.g., an epidemic) are difficult
116
to see as resulting from small causes (e.g., a bacterium or virus).
As with all analogical reasoning, the effects of the analogies and
metaphors involving anger go beyond the very real, but coinciden-
tal, shared characteristics that led to their original employment." 7
Once one begins to conceptualize anger in terms of a similar
physiological experience, the perception of the emotion takes on
additional qualities, qualities that are inferred based on the meta-
phor rather than on the original experience itself. Put more
simply, we tend to take metaphors literally.
Anger may share many physiological attributes with heat and
pressure, but it is the conceptual notion of the boiling kettle on a
hot burner, and not our physiological experience of anger, that
tells us that the cause of the emotion comes from outside the per-
son (from the victim, by analogy to the heating element), and also
that, once the aggravating cause goes away, the anger should start
to subside. Just as the kettle begins to cool down when it is
removed from the heat source, the angry person should begin to
cool down as time passes after the provoking event. Such implica-
tions, however, are often unwarranted. A good deal of evidence
suggests that these similar-in-appearance but different-in-origin
bodily experiences can turn out, in fact, to be very distinct in phys-
iological terms-for example, tears due to a foreign object in the
eye actually have a different chemical composition from tears pro-
115. Id. at 395.
116. Cf RICHARD E. NISBETr & LEE D. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OFSOCIALJUDGMENT 183-86 (1980).
117. LAKOFF& JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 13.
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duced by an emotional experience. 1 8 Surely these similar but dif-
ferentiated physiological experiences do not necessarily constrain
behavioral reactions in the same way.
Unlike many traditional legal metaphors, which are employed as
rhetorical or narrative devices in a flexible manner subject to a
wide range of choice by the user, the emotion metaphor of the
"heat of passion" is sticky because it is difficult to alter, being so
strongly rooted in human physiological experience. Glucksberg
has noted that language forces and constrains thought in a fairly
strong way."9 He suggests, however, that metaphors may not be
nearly as constraining. Others, such as Clark, have used metaphors
for time as an example. 20 According to his work, time can be
viewed as linear, either horizontal or vertical, and time can also be
viewed as possessing volume. Time can move with respect to the
self, or the self can move with respect to time. Various metaphors
can be used to capture these different views of time. For example,
time can be viewed as a linear trajectory (e.g., "don't look back at
the past") or as a substance possessing volume (e.g., "he has more
time than he knows what to do with"). Other abstract metaphors
(such as those for life and love) demonstrate a similar slipperiness
with regard to metaphoric conceptualization.
Emotion metaphors based on physiological responses, on the
other hand, are very different. Emotion metaphors like "anger =
heat and pressure" originate in the body's reaction to an emotional
provocation. Being grounded in human physiology, they could not
be different than what they are. This is precisely what we mean
when we call them "sticky metaphors." Such metaphors tend to be
more limited than most in their potential scope, and more con-
straining on thought, language, and judgment. They are
"embodied." 2'
118. William H. Frey II, Denise DeSota-Johnson, Carrie Hoffman & John T. McCall, Ef-
fect of Stimulus on the Chemical Composition of Human Tears, 92 AM. J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 559,
562, 565 (1981).
119. Cf SAM GLUCKSBERG, UNDERSTANDING FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE: FROM METAPHORS
TO IDIOMs 60 (2001); Mary K. Camac & Sam Glucksberg, Metaphors Do Not Use Associations
Between Concepts, They Are Used to Create Them, 13J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIc RES. 443, 450 (1984)
(noting that metaphors are not so constraining on thought).
120. Lera Boroditsky, Metaphoric Structuring: Understanding Time Through Spatial Meta-
phors, 75 COGNITION 1, 26 (2000); Herbert H. Clark, Space, Time, Semantics, and the Child, in
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND THE AcQUISITION OF LANGUAGE 27, 50-52 (Timothy E.
Moore ed., 1973).
121. In this context, we use the term "embodied" differently from the way that Lakoff
often writes about "embodied" metaphors. When Lakoff uses the term "embodied," he is
referring to metaphors like "good = up" and "bad = down." This kind of metaphor is "em-
bodied," in Lakoff's sense of the term, because "up" and "down" have a physical aspect that
can shape subsequent understanding and application of the metaphor. But such metaphors,
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We do not claim that, in general, language or metaphors con-
strain thought in a tight and highly determined way. However, we
do claim that certain metaphors-the sticky ones-constrain
thought and judgment in a relatively strong way because of their
grounding in bodily experiences, and thus their virtual inevitability
as conceptual and linguistic devices. The linguistic relativity prin-
ciple, as first proposed by Whorf, stated that differences among
languages (in grammar, syntax, word frequency, etc.) would lead to
corresponding differences in thought.1 2 2 Early studies were not es-
pecially supportive of this principle, at least in its strongest form. 2 3
The strong form of Whorf's principle asserts that language severely
limits thought, such that subtleties of experience not labeled by
one's language are literally imperceptible. More recently, how-
ever, there has been a great deal of evidentiary support for a
weaker form of linguistic relativity,2 one positing that although
language does not determine thought, there is still much room for
language to influence thought. The weaker version of the linguistic
relativity principle implies cross-linguistic differences in cognitive
tendency rather than potentiality. It is this weak form of Whorf's
principle that we endorse.
The stickiness of sticky metaphors is not an all-or-nothing qual-
ity. Metaphors exist on a continuum between sticky and flexible,
depending on the degree of similarity between the concept or
thing being described by the metaphor and the analogous concept
or thing with which it shares at least some physical or physiological
aspects. The physiological experience of anger is relatively well-
defined and relatively narrow in scope, and maps almost perfectly
onto the physiology of heat and pressure. An emotion associated
with a less well-defined set of physiological responses, and which
shares fewer similarities with another concept or thing, will be con-
at their inception, are essentially arbitrary. We could just as easily have said, "good = down,"
and "bad = up." These metaphors, in other words, begin as freely chosen or culturally con-
tingent ones, and only later acquire the character of "embodiment," That makes them
different from emotion metaphors, which are "embodied" at their inception, not arbitrary,
and neither freely chosen nor culturally contingent. As K6vecses puts it: "Systematic links
take us from (possibly universal) actual physiology of anger through conceptualized meton-
ymy and metaphor to cultural models." K6vecses, supra note 2, at 391.
122. Cf BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY: SELECTED WIuT-
INGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHoRF 212-13 (John B. Carroll ed., 1956).
123. E.g., Eleanor Rosch Heider & Donald C. Olivier, The Structure of the Color Space in
Naming and Memory for Two Languages, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 337, 350 (1972).
124. Id.
125. E.g., Lera Boroditsky, Does Language Shape Thought?: Mandarin and English Speakers'
Conceptions of Time, 43 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1, 20 (2001); Elise J. Percy et al., Cognition and
Native-Language Grammar: The Organizational Role of Adjective-Noun Word Order in Information
Representation, 16 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 1037, 1041 (2009).
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ceptualized in terms of a metaphorical structure that is less sticky.
We will encounter an example of such a less-sticky sticky metaphor
later in this Article, when we apply the same model and analysis to
the emotion of fear.
Our metaphors for anger are very sticky. These metaphors are
not mere rhetorical devices. Instead, they are so dominant in our
thinking and our discourse-including our legal discourse-that
they can scarcely be recognized as metaphors at all. In this way, our
thinking about anger seems preordained. We cannot arbitrarily
choose any rhetorical device to conceptualize anger; instead, we
experience a strong tendency to think about anger in particular
metaphorical terms. Such metaphors inhere in physiological re-
sponses to a situation. That is, the heat and pressure metaphors for
anger are not freely chosen. They are the result of the similar phys-
iological experiences associated with the two different situations.
As explained by Lakoff, "[O]ur concept of anger is embodied via
the autonomic nervous system and ... the conceptual metaphors
and metonymies used in understanding anger are by no means ar-
bitrary; instead they are motivated by our physiology."',
D. Stage Four: The Development of a Lay Theory About Anger
The fourth stage of our model involves the process by which
metaphorical thought and metaphorical language about an emo-
tion develop into a lay theory, or "folk psychology," of the emotion,
its operation, and its behavioral effects. The tendency for anger to
be conceptualized in terms of heat and pressure has important im-
plications for how people think about, and deal with, anger and its
associated behaviors-that is, for how "folk psychology" theories
about the emotion of anger originate and evolve.
Metaphors can develop into beliefs in the form of lay theories.
According to Hong, Levy, and Chiu, "[L]ike scientific theories, lay
theories serve the epistemic function of sense making."27 Such
theories begin to develop in childhood,2 8 are often transmitted
and encapsulated by cultural artifacts," such as the media, and are
frequently employed as individuals try to understand their social
126. LAKOFF, supra note 12, at 407.
127. Ying-yi Hong, Sheri R Levy & Chi-yue Chiu, The Contribution of the Lay Theories Ap-
proach to the Study of Groups, 5 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 98, 99 (2001).
128. Jessica A. Cameron et al., Children's Lay Theories About Ingroups and Outgroups: Recon-
ceptualizing Research on Preudice, 5 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 118, 124 (2001).
129. Michael M. Morris et al., Culturally Conferred Conceptions of Agency: A Key to Social Per-
ception of Persons, Groups, and Other Actors, 5 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 169, 180
(2001).
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world.'" Metaphor often plays a vital role in the development of lay
theories about psychology. As Steven Winter has observed, "Meta-
phor ... refers to a tightly structured set of conceptual mappings
in which a target domain is understood in terms of a source do-
main of more readily comprehended, embodied, or social
,0u31
experience.
Surely there are few areas of human behavior that culturally re-
quire more explanation, attention, and intervention than violent
acts resulting from anger. Understanding and minimizing violent
outbursts of anger has been an important social and cultural task
throughout recorded human history. As such, we are motivated to
ask questions about anger. Where does it come from? What behav-
iors can we expect to result from it? In the most straightforward
sense, there are some direct (and non-metaphorical) observations
and experiences that people use to address these questions (for
example, "He got angry when he found his wife in bed with her
lover," or "When two people fight, sometimes they can get so mad
that they want to kill each other").
The research on metaphor, however, makes clear that the stan-
dard metaphorical devices for anger (heat and pressure) can easily
lend themselves to addressing these important questions as well. As
noted in the preceding section, metaphors for anger, such as a pot
of water boiling on a stove, depict anger as something that stems
from events and individuals that are external to the angry person
("he made me mad"; "his cheating wife drove him crazy, not his
own jealousy"; "she pissed him off."). These metaphors strongly
imply external causation. That is, the pot does not heat itself; ra-
ther, it is heated by the flame/electric coil/magnetic induction of
the burner on the stove. The water in the pot merely reacts, in a
manner that is relatively determined and perhaps even inevitable,
to the heat provided by the burner. When the burner gets hot, it
makes the water in the pot boil. In the case of an allegedly pro-
voked intentional homicide, the tendency to view anger (boiling
heat) as externally caused leads us to place relatively less blame on
the defendant (pot of water) and relatively more blame on the vic-
tim (burner).
Also like the pot of water boiling on the stove, the natural ten-
dency of anger is toward force and violence ("all that anger just
caused him to explode"; "he flew off the handle"; "he blew up."), at
130. Cf Brian Lickel, David L. Hamilton 8c Steven J. Sherman, Elements ofa Lay Theory of
Groups: Types of Groups, Relational Styles, and the Perception of Group Entitativity, 5 PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 135 (2001).
131. Steven L. Winter, The Color of Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR
AND THOUGHT 368 (Raymond W. Gibbs ed., 2008).
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least until enough "cooling off" time has passed after the original
"heating" or aggravating event (". . . but once he took that walk, he
calmed down enough to control himself'; "simmer down!"). As-
suming that the boiling pot is not moved off the burner to "cool
off," then the dominant metaphors for anger tend to predict a cer-
tain kind of behavioral reaction. The heat and pressure metaphors
imply a particular action tendency-a forcing outward, as in boil-
ing or explosion. 3 2 One can expect a boiling pot of water to force
itself outward, or to boil over. The worst situation, in metaphorical
terms, would involve an overheated pressure cooker which, if left
on the hot burner too long, might literally explode and kill some-
one. These standard metaphors for anger lead us to anticipate
forceful action as the natural, probable, foreseeable, and under-
standable result of such an intense emotional experience. Relevant
to the doctrine of voluntary manslaughter, in the case of extreme
anger this anticipated force may turn out to be violent, even homi-
cidal.
Lay theories of emotion link the emotion and its derived meta-
phors to behavior, as in the final act of intentional killing. For
extreme anger, it is a simple and relatively short step from heat,
pressure, and resulting violent behavior to killing. Thus, the volun-
tary manslaughter doctrine is easily applied to anger-induced
killings. The lay theories derive from the metaphors that are used
for the specific emotion because these metaphors are in a sense
taken literally. Heat and pressure link easily to aggression, boiling
over, and even homicide. In addition, these lay theories are based
in part on the speed or temporal distance between the provocation
and the killing. In terms of the lay theory, a fast response equals
automatic, uncontrollable, and not-goal-directed action, and anger
killings usually occur shortly after the provocation. A longer re-
sponse time is taken to imply more reasoned action and
thoughtful, rather than automatic, behavior. 3
132. K6vecses, supra note 2, at 148-49.
133. Empirical psychology research supports the conclusion that-as a general
matter-automatic behavior occurs faster than reasoned behavior. See Jonathan St. B. T.
Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, judgment, and Social Cognition, 59 ANN. REV. PSY-
CHOL. 255, 255 (2008). These differentiations of "faster" automatic processes and "slower"
controlled processes in the psychological literature are far subtler than the associated lay
theories would indicate. For example, psychological experiments in which automatic and
controlled processes are mathematically dissociated demonstrate that controlled processes
exert effects in less than one second of time. E.g., B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The
Role of Automatic and Contrlled Pwcesses in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 181, 185 (2001). As a result, the lay notion that such processes can be differenti-
ated by the passing of minutes or hours is out of step with psychological science, which
shows that controlled processes can exert effects with great speed.
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One might say that the effects of metaphorical stickiness can be
found at both the level of the individual as well as the cultural lev-
el. That is, the "anger = heat and pressure" metaphor arises not
only as one's own experience highlights the similarity of the emo-
tional experience to the metaphor, but also on a cultural level, as
such metaphors become widespread linguistic devices that help to
shape a society's folk beliefs about how anger operates. Humans
are motivated to understand and explain behavior, both our own
and that of others."' Emotion metaphors provide a means of mak-
ing sense of what would otherwise be confusing and mysterious
experiences. Within a particular culture, metaphorical emphasis
upon one or more aspects of the common physiological experi-
ence of a particular emotion can evolve into a shared metaphorical
structure for the emotion that pervades the culture. As this occurs,
the metaphor essentially "sticks" not only to our individual cogni-
tive experience, but also to our socio-cultural conventions.
E. Stage Five: The Effect on the Law
The fifth and final step in our model involves the process by
which emotion metaphors, and the lay wisdom or lay theory that
employs such metaphors as a way to think about emotions, might
affect the development of legal doctrine. In order to analyze this
process, we will continue with our present focus on the "heat of
passion" defense.
The traditional Anglo-American doctrine of voluntary man-
slaughter developed many centuries ago in the decisions of
common-law judges. Of course, we can no longer study those early
common-law judges to determine the actual process by which they
reached their decisions. At the time, the science of psychology
would have been either non-existent or in its earliest infancy, and
thus no sophisticated psychological theories of emotion would
have been available to the judges. A common-law judge seeking to
understand, and thereby to morally evaluate, human behavior un-
der conditions of extreme anger would have had no other choice
but to turn to lay theory about the emotion of anger based on met-
aphorical language and metaphorical thought.135
134. Cf FRITz HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 60 (1958).
135. A good example of such judicial reliance on lay reasoning about human
psychology-including a frank admission that judges are less equipped than jurors to engage
in such lay reasoning-can be seen in the voluntary manslaughter case of Maher v. People, 10
Mich. 212 (1862):
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Although this common-law judicial decision process itself is no
longer within our capability to observe or to study, the results of
that long-ago process are apparent in the very language of the tra-
ditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine. The doctrine applies
only to those who kill in the "heat of passion." The doctrine is de-
nied to those who have, or who should have, "cooled off."'36 The
two paradigmatic examples of the doctrine both reflect the law's
focus on anger as the particular emotion that is provoked and that
undermines reason. The provocation of mutual combat, or of wit-
nessing adultery, makes the defendant "hot," causing a buildup of
"pressure" and leading ultimately to an "explosion" of lethal
But if the act of killing, though intentional, be committed under the influence of
passion or in heat of blood, produced by an adequate or reasonable provocation, and
before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to resume its
habitual control, and is the result of the temporary excitement, by which the control
of reason was disturbed, rather than of any wickedness of heart or cruelty or reckless-
ness of disposition; then the law, out of indulgence to the frailty of human nature, or
rather, in recognition of the laws upon which human nature is constituted, very
properly regards the offense as of a less heinous character than murder, and gives it
the designation of manslaughter....
To the question, what shall be considered in law a reasonable or adequate provoca-
tion for such state of mind, so as to give to a homicide, committed under its
influence, the character of manslaughter? On principle, the answer, as a general rule,
must be, anything the natural tendency of which would be to produce such a state of
mind in ordinary men, and which the jury are satisfied did produce it in the case be-
fore them ....
It is, doubtless, in one sense, the province of the court to define what, in law, will
constitute a reasonable or adequate provocation, but not, I think, in ordinary cases,
to determine whether the provocation proved in the particular case is sufficient or
reasonable. This is essentially a question of fact, and to be decided with reference to
the peculiar facts of each particular case....
Besides the consideration that the question is essentially one of fact, jurors, from the
mode of their selection, coming from the various classes and occupations of society,
and conversant with the practical affairs of life, are, in my opinion, much better qual-
ified to judge of the sufficiency and tendency of a given provocation, and much more
likely to fix, with some degree of accuracy, the standard of what constitutes the aver-
age of ordinary human nature, than the judge whose habits and course of life give
him much less experience of the workings of passion in the actual conflicts of life.
Id. at 219-22.
136. See, e.g., People v. Dominguez, No. 6026530, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 363, at
*10 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002) (inquiring whether "the five minutes between the quarrel
and the shooting provided either sufficient time to reflect, showing malice aforethought, or
allowed a continuing buildup of emotional steam as a result of the quarrel which exploded
into manslaughter"); Ex parte Fraley, 109 P. 295, 297 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910); State v.
Gounagias, 153 P. 9, 12, 14 (Wash. 1915).
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violence. 37 As in the case of actual heat applied to actual liquid
confined in an actual closed container, it is the "heat" that is the
true cause of the "explosion"'"S-nobody would think to blame the
liquid trapped in the closed container for exploding.
Regardless of how the traditional legal doctrine of voluntary
manslaughter originated, what is most important to recognize is
that the relative stickiness of the dominant metaphorical structure
that underlies the traditional doctrine can help to explain why the
doctrine has proven so resistant to change in modern times. We
can talk all we want about the many normative and empirical ar-
guments that favor either a broader or a narrower application of
the doctrine-the Model Penal Code chose to advocate for a
broader approach"' although others have argued for a narrower
one'"-but all such arguments eventually run into trouble pre-
cisely because they are, or appear to be, incompatible with the
metaphorical structure of anger. We continue to think, and to be-
have, as if the metaphor is literally true.141
This sticky resistance to doctrinal change matters. For one thing,
the resiliency of the traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine
means that the doctrine will continue to be employed in a gender-
biased manner. We expect women to fight less and to attack less,
and this is likely a reasonable expectation."' Biernat has proposed
a "shifting standards" model that helps to explain both this expec-
tation and its consequences. 1 Biernat's basic idea is that objects
and people are judged with respect to their attributes by compar-
ing them to other instances of their own relevant category or
reference group. Elephants are judged with respect to other ele-
137. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 204 N.E.2d 594, 595, 597-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (mutual
combat); Rowland v. State, 35 So. 826, 827 (Miss. 1904) (witnessing adultery).
138. See, e.g., People v. Rich, 755 P.2d 960, 1009 (Cal. 1988) (explaining that, for both
voluntary manslaughter and second-degree murder, "the inquiry is whether the ordinary
person would 'explode' because the victim resisted"); People v. Le, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 831, 841
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) ("[Defendant's wife's] insult simply served as the spark that caused this
powder keg of accumulated provocation to explode."); People v. Hammock, 385 N.E.2d 796,
799, 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (affirming trial court's decision to instruct jury on voluntary
manslaughter when defendant stated that she killed as a result of an "explosion of rage");
State v. Madden, 294 A.2d 609, 621 (N.J. 1972) (stating that "[t]he conventional picture [of
voluntary manslaughter] is that of a defendant who exploded in response to some injury or
affront to which he was subjected by the deceased").
139. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1) (b) & cmt. (1985).
140. See Nourse, supra note 41, at 1332, 1336-38; cf Stuart M. Kirschner, Thomas R.
Litwack & Gary J. Galperin, The Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance: A Qualitative Analysis
of Cases in New York County, 10 PsYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 102, 131 (2004).
141. See, e.g., Nelson & Simmons, supra note 106, at 722-23.
142. See Buss, supra note 44, at 25.
143. Monica Biernat & Melvin Manis, Shifting Standards and Stereotype-Based Judgments, 66
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 5-6, 18 (1994).
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phants, and mice are judged with respect to other mice. A very
small elephant is much bigger than a very large mouse.
The same is true for judgments of men and women. A "tall"
woman may be the same height or even shorter than a "short"
man. With respect to aggression, because women are (accurately)
expected to be less aggressive than men, a woman who is violent,
or who kills when provoked, will likely be judged as more violent
and more evil than a man who commits exactly the same acts. If
homicidal women are indeed judged especially harshly due to the
"shifting standards" problem, then the voluntary manslaughter
doctrine will likely do them no good, and they will not benefit
from its partial mitigation of crime and punishment. The voluntary
manslaughter doctrine, like the law in general, is grounded in the
male experience, and both the lay theory and the dominant meta-
phorical structure of the emotions to which the doctrine typically
applies ensure that it will continue to be so applied.
III. APPLICATION OF THE "STICKY METAPHOR" THEORY
TO THE EMOTION OF FEAR
What about voluntary manslaughter cases that involve strong
emotions other than anger? Here we shall give primary considera-
tion to killings that are provoked by strong fear. Just as we analyzed
anger from the point of view of our conceptual theory and sche-
matic model, we will now analyze the emotion of fear in the same
manner. This analysis will reveal that fear is very similar to anger in
terms of the applicability of our model, that is, in the development
of its embodied metaphors and in the influence of those meta-
phors and the resulting lay theories upon legal doctrine. However,
the sticky metaphors generally used to describe fear and the lay
theory of fear derived from those metaphors turn out to be very
different from those that developed for anger. These differences
have important consequences for the law.
A. Stage One and Stage Two: The Physiological Experience of Fear and
Its Similarity to the Physiological Experience of Cold
Returning to our model, we must first identify the normal physi-
ological characteristics of fear in response to a fear-provoking
event or series of events, and then identify an analogous setting or
context in which the same or similar physiological responses typi-
cally would occur. In the same way that the physiological
417WINTER 2011 ]
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experience of anger bears a close similarity to experiencing heat,
so the physiology of fear bears some outward similarity to the ex-
perience of feeling cold: including a decrease in skin temperature,
shaking or trembling, a loss of blood from the face producing pale
skin, and goosebumps.'"
In general, fear can be described as neurologically, cognitively,
and behaviorally more complex than anger. While anger may be
somewhat complex in terms of its origination because-despite the
limits on the traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine-it can
arise quickly in response to a single provoking event, slowly as a
result of brooding, or cumulatively in response to repeated provo-
cations, it is relatively simple in terms of its behavioral
consequences: anger usually leads to aggressive, attack behavior.
Fear, on the other hand, is relatively complex in several different
ways.
First, neurologically speaking, the brain regions involved in fear
and the behaviors that follow depend upon the level of threat and
especially upon the psychological distance from the threat. "Small-
er defensive distances map to more caudal, subcortical, neural
structures while larger ones map to more rostral, cortical, neural
structures.""'5 In addition, fear is associated with different thought
patterns than those associated with anger.14 6 Whereas anger is char-
acterized by a pattern of appraisal that involves a sense of certainty,
optimistic risk assessment, a sense of control, a feeling of power,
and superficial and quick processing of information, fear, by con-
trast, is associated with uncertainty, pessimistic risk assessment, a
feeling of powerlessness, and an overall sense of lack of control.1 4 7
One who is very afraid often feels powerless and unable to deal
144. Valentina Apresjan, Emotion Metaphors and Cross-Linguistic Conceptualization of Emo-
tions, 612 CUADERNOS DE FILOLOGiA INGLESA 179, 181 (1997) (Spain) ("Indeed, fear is
linguistically conceptualized as cold because the feeling 'fear' and the sensation 'cold' share
the same physiological manifestations . . . ."); Ekman, Levenson & Friesen, supra note 19, at
1209.
145. Neil McNaughton & Philip J. Corr, A Two-Dimensional Neuropsychology of Defense:
Fear/Anxiety and Defensive Distance, 28 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVs. 285, 286
(2004). McNaughton and Corr also make the related point that "fear" and "anxiety," al-
though similar, trigger different areas of the brain and lead to different behaviors: fear leads
to the standard fight/flight/freezing response, whereas anxiety inhibits a number of behav-
ioral responses in a manner that enables the anxious person to approach the source of
danger. Id.
146. Lerner & Tiedens, supra note 89, at 117, 121-22.
147. Id. at 147, 154.
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with the threat. Both anger and fear, however, similarly undermine
rational decision-making.1 4 1
Just as anger is associated with certain behavioral tendencies, so
too is fear. Unlike the case of anger, which is characterized by the
single behavioral tendency to attack, however, the normal physio-
logical responses to fear historically have been found to prepare
the body for at least three distinct possible behaviors: flee, fight, or
freeze.'4 9 In this sense, the action tendencies that are produced by
intense fear are more complex, and more difficult to predict, than
those that result from intense anger.
Cesario's recent work has painted an even more complex pic-
ture of fear's behavioral outcomes, in which there are actually five
distinct possible behavioral responses to fear: (1) flee, (2) freeze,
(3) hide, (4) attack, and (5) assess risk.'" The particular response
will depend on the nature of the threat and other features of the
overall situation, such as the size of the threat, ease of escape, am-
biguity of the threat, physical distance from the threat, and having
a suitable place to hide. These responses to fear are prepro-
grammed, 5' automatic,5 2 and evolutionarily determined.'53
Although we would agree with Cesario that there is a strong au-
tomatic and evolutionary component to typical fear responses, it is
also true that there are numerous gender-based, social, and cul-
tural components implicated by the responses to fear.5 4 Thus, in
addition to hard-wired components, there are also crucial learned
aspects to fear behaviors.
B. Stage Three: Sticky Metaphors for Fear
Consider the language of fear, focusing on the dominant terms
used to describe it. The words and expressions that we use for fear
are markedly different from those that we use for anger. Whereas
anger is hot, fear is cold. Many of our metaphorical expressions for
148. See generally Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, "Rational Understanding," and
the Criminal Defendant 40-41 (Univ. S. Cal. Legal Stud. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 7,
2006).
149. SeeJEFFREY ALAN GRAY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR AND STRESS 26, 192 (1971).
150. Joseph Cesario et al., The Ecology of Automaticity: How Situational Contingencies Shape
Action Semantics and Social Behavior, 21 PSYCHOL. Sc. 1311, 1312 (2010).
151. Id.at1311.
152. D. Caroline Blanchard et al., Human Defensive Behaviors to Threat Scenarios Show Par-
allels to Fear- and Anxiety-Related Defense Patterns of Non-Human Mammals, 25 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REvs. 761, 761 (2001).
153. Id.
154. See id. at 766, 769 (discussing gender, social, and cultural components involved in
responses to fear).
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fear employ this notion of low environmental temperature: "he was
frozen with fear"; "I felt an icy chill run down my spine." Despite the
fact that the ambient temperature in a fearful situation might be
perfectly comfortable, or even warm, the experience of terror can
indeed create the distinct sense of coldness. As with anger, these
metaphorical concepts develop based on similar outward character-
istics-normal physiological responses to terror-provoking situations
often resemble physiological responses to a cold environment, such
as low skin temperature, pale skin, and shaking."' As a result, the
language of cold becomes both a conceptual and a linguistic device
to think and talk about such emotional experiences: "when he saw
the man, he froze." This "freezing" clearly implies the idea of passiv-
ity and motionlessness, almost like that of a dead body: "he was
petrified"; "she turned pale with fear"; "a blood-curdling fear"; "he
was scared to death"; "white as a ghost."
These metaphors, grounded as they are in embodied experi-
ence, represent another group of sticky metaphors. As a result,
these metaphors, like those for anger, are often taken quite liter-
ally. Because our metaphors for cold derive from physiological
experiences which are relatively narrow in scope, the metaphors
themselves are similarly constrained.
Although the more complex nature of the emotion of fear sug-
gests the possibility of alternative metaphorical structures for fear,
the "fear = freezing cold" metaphor dominates. We believe that this
metaphor is the one that often constrains the law with regard to
how we treat intentional killings committed under the influence of
the emotion of fear. In a sense, this process bears a striking similar-
ity to our description of anger in that, as with anger, a sticky
metaphor develops due to the similarity between an emotional ex-
perience and the experience of a particular environmental
temperature. However, the particular sticky metaphors commonly
used to describe fear suggest a full range of characteristics virtually
the opposite of those that are implied by the dominant metaphors
for anger. While anger metaphors might describe an explosion of
heat from an external provoking source, fear is linked with an in-
ward tendency toward a barely-quivering stillness. Such sticky
metaphors are constrained and are inextricably linked to the emo-
tions they illustrate. For example, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
employ a "freezing" conceptualization for violent anger in re-
sponse to provocation, or a "boiling over" conceptualization for
violence resulting from fear.




C. Stage Four: The Development of a Lay Theory About Fear
The fourth step in our model is to integrate the sticky metaphor
for fear into lay theories about fear. The relevant metaphors for
anger lead people to expect an attack, a boiling over, an explosion.
Not so for fear. The dominant freezing metaphors for fear predict
the very opposite response: passivity and stillness. This leads to the
development of a lay theory of fear in which we expect that indi-
viduals under conditions of terror will tend to freeze rather than to
fight or to kill. For this reason, unlike anger, fear does not link so
easily to a lay expectation of homicidal violence.
Unlike the cuckolded husband, bursting with the heat of his
rage, the battered wife generally acts out of intense fear when she
takes a life. And as a result of the different means of conceptualiz-
ing these emotions, the battered wife does not have the advantage
of a lay theory for her emotions that (1) implies external causality
of actions and (2) depicts a situation in which violent and forceful
reaction is an understandable and predictable response. As a re-
sult, cultural responses to such a situation will ultimately be very
different. Consider, for example, "She was scared of him" versus
"He scared her," or "All that fear led her to coldly plot his murder"
versus "All that fear just caused her to explode."
There is a related and important distinction between "hot" and
"cold" behavior. "Hot behavior" (associated primarily with anger)
appears not to be goal directed, whereas "cold behavior" (associ-
ated primarily with fear) does appear goal directed. Moreover, hot,
impassioned behavior tends to be associated with a lack of free will
and deliberation. To kill in cold blood is incompatible with mitiga-
tion for killing,156 and fear is cold. Given the aggressive nature of
the emotion of anger, angry killings often occur with great speed,
i.e., not much time may elapse between the origination of the an-
ger and the killing. With fear (e.g., a battered wife), on the other
hand, the fearful individual often lives with the fear-generating sit-
uation for a long time and may try out many possible solutions.5 1
The ultimate killing therefore often appears to be an act of free
will and thoughtful behavior. In fact, the metaphors employed
156. See DRESSLER, supra note 75, at 509-10 (explaining how "cold-blooded" killings fit
the classic legal definition of first-degree "premeditated" murder, and premeditation is gen-
erally viewed as incompatible with the idea of a provoked, "heat of passion" killing).
157. See generally ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (1987) (discussing
the battered spouse defense).
158. Note the normative irony here. Logic indicates that we should actually punish an-
ger-driven killing more severely than fear-driven killing-because the provocation for anger-
based killing is traditionally an adulterous partner or a male challenge. See supra text ac-
companying note 43. The provoking event is not an illegal act. For the battered wife who
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rationality itself (e.g., "coldly plotting," "coolly planned," "cool
and collected") are far more compatible with the metaphors for icy
fear than with those for burning anger, and may thereby impact
perceptions of intentionality. That is, in terms of the metaphors
used, the dominant conceptualization of fear is particularly consis-
tent with that of planning and rationality, and so the display of fear
by an actor may directly lead to inferences of a capacity for rea-
soned actions.'
It is important to note that the lay theory about fear does not
closely correspond to contemporary research evidence about fear.
Just as we saw that the lay theory of anger did not fit with scientific
evidence (especially with regard to a rapid "cooling off' period),
the lay theory for fear is likewise not supported by sound research
findings. Rather than freezing, the more common responses to
fear, in both animals and humans, are either flight or fight'". In
fact, one important research finding was that an inescapable situa-
tion, where freezing might be the expected behavioral response,
did not in fact produce freezing behavior.'6' Thus, both our expec-
tations and our lay theories of freezing, under conditions of fear,
are wrong. The metaphors, however, clearly indicate freezing, and
they are sticky metaphors.
In sum, the behavioral responses to a threat are generally to
fight or to flee, and these responses are automatic, rather than
freely chosen. People freeze less than we expect, but the dominant
metaphors, and the lay theory based on them, would seem to indi-
cate otherwise.
kills out of fear, the provocation is an illegal act, a felony-she was being beaten by her hus-
band.
159. Letter from Chen-Bo Zhong, Assistant Professor, Organizational Behavior and
Human Resource Management, University of Toronto, to author (June 18, 2010) (on file
with author). Zhong also suggested to us that the metaphors for rationality ("a cool head";
"cold-blooded") may themselves be examples of "sticky" metaphors. Upon reflection, we
note that such "stickiness" may derive from the fact that people who are thinking rationally
tend to share certain physiological characteristics-calmness, lowered pulse rate, lowered
blood pressure, absence of agitated physical movements-with people who are actually cold.
Id. In other words, the metaphors for rationality may well be, at least in part, "embodied" in
shared physical experiences, which would tend to make them "sticky." On the other hand,
there are also distinct metaphors for "rationality," e.g., "calculating," "machine-like," that
would not be similarly "embodied."




D. Stage Five: The Effect on the Law
Moving to the fifth and final stage of our model, how might such
metaphors, and the lay theories derived from them, influence the
voluntary manslaughter doctrine? If our metaphors suggest that
those who experience fear become cold, passive, and death-like,
then perhaps it is predictable that the law may not expect people
confronted with a frightening event to react violently. Instead, the
law may expect them to "freeze" and do nothing, or perhaps to
move away from the threat. If a fearful person instead reacts vio-
lently and kills the threatening person, the law may see such a
violent reaction as abnormal and therefore deserving of full and
severe condemnation and punishment, rather than viewing the
reaction as understandable and therefore worthy of partial mitiga-
tion. And given the relative rarity of female killers, the law might
be even more reluctant to extend mitigation to women than to
men.' 2 If legal doctrine is, indeed, affected by the metaphorical
structure of thought and language, then it is predictable that the
voluntary manslaughter doctrine will include relatively few cases of
mitigated punishment for defendants who kill out of fear.
The process for anger and for fear, as they develop from physio-
logical similarity to metaphorical structures to lay theories, is
exactly the same. But in the case of anger, the metaphors and the
lay theory are generally compatible with the assumptions and re-
quirements of the voluntary manslaughter doctrine. Thus, the
doctrine applies frequently to angry killings. In the case of fear, on
the other hand, the metaphors and the lay theory are not so com-
patible with the law's assumptions and requirements. The doctrine
consequently applies far less frequently to fearful killings, even
though both of these emotions are very strong and both are capa-
ble of producing extremely aggressive behaviors.
IV. DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF STICKY
METAPHORS IN THE LAW
In order to show how such metaphors have made it difficult to
reform the traditional doctrine of voluntary manslaughter, we have
defined and described a conceptual theory of sticky metaphors,
presented a schematic model of how such metaphors arise and
how they affect the evolution of legal doctrine, and examined the
particular metaphorical structures for anger and for fear.
162. See Biernat & Manis, supra note 143, at 18-19.
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What, then, should the law attempt to do about the problem of
sticky metaphors? What, if anything, can lawyers do to help their
clients avoid being adversely affected by such problems, especially
where those problems may prevent the law from acknowledging
the true moral culpability of the lawyer's client, or from changing
in an empirically or normatively preferable direction?
One possible strategy for lawyers dealing with the problem of
sticky metaphors is to recognize the problem, and try to work with-
in whatever "wiggle room" the relevant metaphorical structure
might allow. For example, in the context of angry killings, the
dominant metaphorical structure is all about heat and pressure.
But a lawyer might try to emphasize either one or the other of the
two components, heat or pressure, depending on the facts and cir-
cumstances of the individual case.
More significantly, even though the standard metaphors for an-
ger involve heat in the form of a fire, flame, burner, grill, or some
other acute source of heat that can be applied directly to a closed
container, a lawyer might try to use a different kind of heat meta-
phor-a crock pot, or a simmering pot, or a slow bum-in an
effort to nudge the metaphor a bit, and thereby serve the interests
of his or her client. Such an approach, although subtle and still
well within the boundaries of the dominant "heat and pressure"
metaphorical structure, nevertheless might open up the possibility
that the jury might conclude that anger can build up more gradu-
ally than the traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine would
suggest.
Along somewhat similar lines, and assuming that the norma-
tive goal of the voluntary manslaughter doctrine is to mitigate the
crime and punishment for those defendants whose acts of inten-
tional killing are at least partially attributable to extremely
provoking circumstances, rather than entirely to -their own evil
characters, then extreme fear should be able to serve as a plausible
ground for invoking the defense. Even if fear is somewhat different
from anger in its physiological effects, fear can nevertheless distort
a person's decision-making enough to make the act of killing far
less culpable than it would have been without the fear.
163. The psychological naivete of the traditional voluntary manslaughter doctrine ren-
ders the doctrine inapplicable to some angry killers as well as some fearful killers. But the
mechanism of failure is different. In cases of anger, those killers whose anger builds slowly
and cumulatively over time will lose because they do not fit within the standard metaphor
for anger. In the case of fear, on the other hand, most killers lose for a different reason-




In the context of killings that result from extreme fear, such as a
killing by a battered wife, a defense lawyer might try to describe the
killer not as a person who might have been "frozen" with fear, but
instead as one who "lashed out" like a "terrified caged/trapped
animal." This metaphor differs from the normal one for fear be-
cause it invokes the idea of fighting, rather than freezing or
fleeing, as the expected behavioral response to fear. The fighting
of a trapped animal might be seen as an act partially devoid of free
will, just as the lethal act of an angry, cuckolded husband might be
partially devoid of free will. The benefits, in terms of possibly per-
suading the jury to think of the defendant more sympathetically,
seem obvious. Lawyers may find it difficult to convince their clients
to adopt such a strategy, however, because it implies that at the
time of the killing the defendant was an animal, or somehow less
than fully human.m
If there are no helpful alternative metaphors within the same
dominant metaphorical structure, then the situation becomes
much more bleak. The stickiness of sticky metaphors may make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a lawyer to use the prod-
ucts of scientific research to trump or overcome the effects of the
metaphor. Science is not favored in many courtrooms anyway, and
an attempt to use science as a way to persuade the judge or jury to
set aside a way of metaphorical thinking that is fully embodied, and
therefore seems entirely natural and unchosen, would seem to be a
Herculean task.'"5 Indeed, we suspect that such a task could be al-
most impossible to complete successfully.
Beyond these strategy suggestions for lawyers, one might
imagine that the law should try to educate trial and appellate
judges (who, unlike most jurors, are repeat players in the criminal
justice system) about the problem of sticky metaphors, in the hope
that those judges might be able to watch for, and perhaps even
correct for, the possible negative effects of such metaphors.
Certainly the law would benefit from a greater awareness of the
nature and scope of this problem. But we do not see much reason
164. Cf Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95, 134 (Miss. 2003) ("Defense counsel did state, in
trying to explain [Defendant]'s way of life in prison of being under constant control of
guards as far as sleeping, meals and showers, as being like a caged animal. Defense counsel
stated that Officer Cotton, in taking [Defendant]'s money and not delivering the yeast, was
in effect poking a caged dog or a caged animal, and this is what caused the rage and help-
lessness in [Defendant] which eventually caused him to kill Officer Cotton."). The trial jury
rejected the defendant's manslaughter argument, and the conviction was affirmed on ap-
peal. Id. at 102.
165. See generally Richard Lempert, Between Cup and Lip: Social Science Influences on Law
and Policy, 10 LAw & POL'Y 167, 173, 186 (1988).
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to be optimistic that, even with greater knowledge, the problem
can be overcome.
The closest analogue might be the ever-present need to teach
airplane pilots to trust in their instruments and not in their own
senses, especially when flying at night or in similar conditions of
low visibility. As a recent article explained:
Once called pilot vertigo or aviator's vertigo, spatial disorien-
tation is a persistent killer. Federal Aviation Administration
statistics show that the condition is at least partly responsible
for about 15 percent of general aviation accidents ... 90 per-
cent of which are fatal. According to a 2004 study, the average
life expectancy of a non-instrument-rated pilot who flies into
clouds or instrument conditions is 178 seconds.... [N]o
amount of expertise, training, or experience immunizes
against spatial disorientation. ... Humans maintain orienta-
tion and posture through a system of senses .... The system
has evolved over cons, and is well adapted for Earth. But it is
easily fooled.... [I]nstinct is worse than useless in the clouds
.... [P]ilots must learn against all contradictory sensations
the difficult discipline of an absolute belief in their instru-
ments.... The only way to completely eliminate the problem
. . . is to develop fully automated aircraft1 6
The task of educating judges to ignore their deeply embedded,
physiologically grounded ways of thinking about emotion, and sub-
stituting instead an "absolute belief' in scientific research, would
seem to be almost as difficult as training pilots to trust their in-
struments over their own instincts. And we will probably never be
able to eliminate the problem by converting to fully automated jus-
tice.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been to introduce the concept of the
sticky metaphor, a concept that previously has received almost no
attention in either psychology literature or law literature, and to
discuss the concept in the contexts of anger, fear, and the voluntary
manslaughter doctrine in the criminal law. We believe that sticky
metaphors-especially in the area of emotion metaphors-are real




and have a real potential to affect the law. In particular, we believe
that the sticky metaphor of "anger = heat and pressure in a closed
container" already affects the law; in our view, it is part of the rea-
son for the persistence of the traditional voluntary manslaughter
doctrine.
Many questions in this area remain unanswered. For instance,
are there any significant categories of sticky metaphors other than
metaphors for the emotions? What about the common metaphori-
cal structure of describing emotional suffering in terms of physical
pain ("it cuts like a knife"; "when she broke up with me, she hurt
me so bad"; "my heart is broken")? Are such metaphors sticky, and
if so, does their stickiness affect tort law and related legal doc-
trines? More generally, studies should be conducted to explore the
extent to which emotion metaphors, as well as other kinds of met-
aphors, are truly sticky. Although the existing scientific evidence, as
reported herein, strongly supports our conclusion that sticky met-
aphors exist, and can affect the law, direct proof of these
propositions remains lacking.
In any event, the acknowledged centrality of metaphor to the
law, and the conceded potential power of the metaphor, should
make it a high priority to continue to expand our knowledge of
metaphor and its effects. Learning more about sticky metaphors
will not necessarily be easy-as Lakoff and Turner note, "[T]he
things most alive in our conceptual system are those things that we
use constantly, unconsciously and automatically"'m-but that is no
reason not to try.
167. LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 12, at 62.
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